WAR AS A SOCIO-CULTURAL PHENOMENON: A CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE AND CONCEPTUALIZATION WITH EMPIRICAL STUDY IN UKRAINE

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Abstract: This research delves into the sociocultural phenomenon of war, focusing on Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine. It examines war through a criminological lens, aiming to understand its short and long-term effects on society. Through empirical analysis of Ukraine's management of the crisis, the study evaluates how the socio-cultural perspective influences war handling. Destructive consequences such as increased stress levels and migration, alongside constructive factors, are identified. The research highlights the criminogenic potential of war trauma and post-war syndrome. Despite various methods and hypotheses, socio-cultural effects persist, posing a complex challenge for Ukraine. War is portrayed as a multifaceted phenomenon influenced by demographic, economic, and ideological factors, as well as historical legacies. Ultimately, the conclusion underscores the irreparable impact of war on the environment, populations, and international relations. This suggests a pressing need for comprehensive efforts to mitigate the long-term consequences of war and foster stable post-conflict societies.

Key words: Criminology of war, Socio-cultural phenomenon, Sociology, War trauma, Ideology, Aggressor.

INTRODUCTION

In connection with the full-scale criminal invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, not just a threat appeared, but a really great danger for the further existence and functioning of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and according to the estimates of many experts, even for itself the existence of the Ukrainian

nation. Today, Ukraine is witnessing the most destructive military conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The acuteness of military aggression is difficult to overestimate, because it is accompanied by special cruelty on the part of the occupiers. During this time, Russian troops committed a large number of war crimes, killed and murdered thousands of Ukrainian citizens, destroyed millions of buildings, and contaminated thousands of hectares of Ukrainian land with mines. Thousands of children were defiantly and cynically deported from the territory of Ukraine, which became the main reason for the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for Mariia Lvova-Bielova and Volodymyr Putin. These events of global importance actualize scientific research into the essence of war crimes and their characteristics, which, unfortunately, is an urgent and relevant issue for Ukraine.

War has traditionally been in the focus of attention of a number of social, humanitarian, and legal sciences, which aim to identify, describe, and explain the main destructive and, presumably, some socially constructive (such as identity, social solidarity, etc.) consequences of armed conflicts. And, of course, each of the subject-autonomous areas of scientific understanding of the complex phenomenon of war is naturally subject to some incompleteness, limited judgments, conclusions, and sometimes their inadequacy and falsity. For example, the traumatization of war caused by war, a clear definition of the contours and markers of the warring parties, leads to the development of a culture of commemorative practices, practices of remembering, perpetuating, and mourning the victims of war. Against this emotional backdrop, the variability of historical memory is narrowing, and trends of selectivity burdened by trauma are forming. The same practices also lead to an increase in aggressive potential, resentment and hatred of social actors affiliated with the enemy, as well as components of the symbolic space. A powerful deterministic complex of hate crimes is being formed, fueled by extensive resentment practices. Or another example: the same trauma and resentment are reflected in the legislative process, often serving as a factor in its inadequacy in terms of criminalizing various manifestations of interaction with the aggressor country (the opposing party). This can be clearly demonstrated by a number of conflicting provisions of Articles 111, 111-1, 111-2, 436-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Obviously, the corpus delicti of crimes against humanity reveal many features which have a common meaning with the features of war crimes, and this creates difficulties in legal application, but the Criminal

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Code of Ukraine does not contain special corpus delicti of crimes against humanity.¹ War is such a comprehensive factor for the social structure, including its demographic and mental components, that it can change the foundations of the entire system of social organization, the direction of its further development, and lay down factors for the recurrence of armed conflict in the future. In order to prevent the worst-case scenarios for victims of aggressive war, the so-called container theories (U. Beck) should be supplemented by interdisciplinary research, some of which is represented by the criminology of war.

In general, it should be noted that all wars have common features and trends in their course and interaction between people, which can be reduced to a common denominator as a struggle for survival or expansion of one's borders and boundaries as a result of power/hegemony, until one can give a worthy rebuff to the enemy. The author concludes that the best way to ensure scientific support for the prevention of wars in the future is to develop a doctrinal reflection of the criminology of war - the criminology of peace - in order to achieve appropriate peaceful states of society through the value component, the fight against disinformation, political propaganda, undemocratic trends in individual countries and regions of the world, appropriate diplomatic prevention, preventive, proactive defense development strategies. Within the framework of war criminology, it is also important to focus on how to stop the ongoing crime of aggression, prevent its recurrence, reduce group (within a political nation, people) victimization, and effectively counteract the accompanying, background criminogenic effects of war - frontline crime, treason, collaboration, hate crimes based on political views, scientific support for transitional justice and work with risk groups - combatants with post-traumatic stress disorder.

The purpose of the study is to define war as a socio-cultural phenomenon and a criminological concept, to correlate them and to establish, describe, and explain the basic, both short-term and long-term effects of the criminalization of society.

**METHOD**

The specifics of the research subject, its purpose and tasks determined the use of general scientific and special methods of scientific cognition. The problem here remains that the methods used should be one of empirical analysis by assessing whether the State of Ukraine has been able in handling the socio-cultural effects that emanates as a result of the supposed war experienced by the country. We do understand all the stakes that war can cause to a country with all it's devastating effects that may be experienced by the citizens of that country, but the problem here is in determining the measures used by the said State in handling the various effects of the war. The dialectic method used by the State of Ukraine is really important in handling the socio-cultural effects that arises as a result of the war in question. At the same time, against the background of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, destructive factors are observed (for example, an increase in

the level of stress, growth of migration processes, domestic violence, etc.), which testifies to the sociocultural phenomenon of war.

As for the research topic, thanks to the dialectical method, the current state of an understanding of the essence of war as a socio-cultural phenomenon. The article employs a diverse array of research methods, combining general scientific and special approaches to comprehensively investigate war as a socio-cultural phenomenon. The utilization of the epistemological method contributes to a clearer understanding of war as a socio-cultural phenomenon.

The application of the axiological method was aimed at clarifying and determining the public danger of war as a socio-cultural phenomenon. In order to substantiate war as a socio-cultural phenomenon, a statistical observation of the indicators of socio-demographic studies of Ukrainian society was conducted (content analysis of 1,425 messages in mass media and mass communication channels). This observation is based on the time frame from March 2022 to March 2023, as well as official statistical data of the State Statistics Service and the indicator of the Office of the Prosecutor General in terms of registered crimes.

The dogmatic method made it possible to analyze scientific studies devoted to general problems of war as a socio-cultural phenomenon. The article extensively reviews literature from free-access resources such as academic journals, National Library of Ukraine named after V.I. Vernadskyi, ResearchUA, Google Scholar, and scientific periodicals of Ukraine. The method of generalization helped to formulate conclusions that summarized the conducted research.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Europe is rightly considered to be one of the parts of the world within which the currently there are a little more than 700 million people in Europe who are distributed across the territories of 50 countries. In the 21st century, in a modern legal democratic state, including Ukraine, the importance of ensuring the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen has increased significantly. In view of all these rights, it becomes the role of every State to consciously ensure the preservation, investigate and even punish all acts that are done against the human whether committed by individuals or State. The desire for just retribution for the suffering caused by the conflict and the existence of fear are

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contrary to plural rationality, the comprehensiveness of truth. This dilemma is a typical manifestation of binary opposition, which makes it impossible to think and practice in the format of nonlinearity of the history, socio-temporal multidimensionality in a single chronotope of pre-conflict and conflict events.¹

The Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine has changed the entire security environment, which will have long-term threatening consequences for the entire collective security system. The issue of forming an effective system of collective security is relevant not only for the international community, which is explained by its absolute importance in maintaining international law and order, but also for Ukraine in order to restore its state sovereignty and territorial integrity in countering Russian armed aggression². Conducting investigations on war crimes has a clear goal of establishing facts on crimes, perpetrators, and victims. On the other hand, the question of forgiveness and reconciliation, as essential conditions for re-establishing the coexistence of former parties at war which continue to live together, in the same community, country, and society (or next to each other), is something completely different. Investigating crimes, establishing facts, and finding and prosecuting individuals for committing those crimes, is an exact, measurable category³.

Today, war is transforming and changing, and everything comes down to the value-motivational struggle of meanings, ideologies, and ideas. The focus of our criminological attention is on various kinds of criminogenic structures. The author describes and explains the sharp differentiation of Ukrainian society associated with different group reactions to the outbreak of a full-scale war. Along with this, the following socio-cultural phenomena are recorded: consolidation of the Ukrainian political nation, but on the basis of an attitude of fighting a common enemy and resentment; aggravation of social inadequacy as a result of narrowing of thinking based on the anxiety of war, inconsistency of thinking with reality and activity; formation of social and temporal fronts, metaphysical lines of struggle for time; emergence of a new language and change of the acoustic space of life; institutionalization of new commemorative

³ Šimić G. “War crimes and spirituality: to prosecute or to forgive and reconcile.” Law and Safety, 90(3) (2023), 68-77. https://doi.org/10.32631/pb.2023.3.06
practices around the perpetuation of war victims and mourning for the dead. It is the socio-cultural phenomenology of war that helps to form its large-scale criminological concept.

It is worth noting that the criminology of war is characterized by a certain and very significant level of scientific development, as evidenced by numerous scientific works. At the same time, highlighting a number of criminologically significant aspects of armed conflicts, the basic category - war - remains insufficiently developed, which is substantively broader than any armed conflict and requires appropriate criminological conceptualization.

In one of the world's best-selling historical and biographical books about Winston Churchill, the author subtly notes: "War changes society. Those members of the British generation who survived the First World War were not the same as when they entered it. And the generation of the 1930s was no longer like them...". ¹ There is no innovation in this observation. However, it has at least two methodologically important implications. The first is that war is indeed a manifestation of a complex and radical, brutal attempt to resolve contradictions that could not be resolved peacefully. Therefore, war, at least for one of the parties, turns out to be a powerful factor of change, at least in the format of the military and combat agenda imposed by the aggressor, and in the case of a loss, a large-scale social agenda. However, the war itself has a powerful backlash on the aggressor's society.

Each war, while having common features, a common inhumane denominator, is at the same time a very unique phenomenon. It is unique because of its causes, peculiarities of its course, geographical areas of conflict, and the social background (in its broadest sense) with which states enter the war, which is transformed and modified in reactions and proactive efforts. The social background represents, first and foremost, the value and motivational (with its related symbolic and discursive, very important both in deterministic and purely cognitive terms) basis for participation, complicity or non-participation in an armed conflict, for experiencing its concomitant consequences, responding to them, and for the formation of social formations of both constructive, welcoming and destructive, criminogenic (in particular, in the long term) significance. They are the focus of criminological science.

What does the combined adjective "socio-cultural" mean, used in the title? It means that any phenomenon that is semiotically combined with this adjective in its description is considered as a factor of ultra-high penetration and complex phenomenology that determines the general directions of sociodynamics. In other words, it is a methodological attitude, a kind of vantage point, the unfolding of the vision from which opens, first, a wide panorama of determinants, manifestations and consequences of war for the whole society. Secondly, it sets the depth of analysis of the war's impact on social structures, systems of social activity, and institutions, which reaches the collective unconscious, causing not only changes in the cultural landscape at the level of the visible (symbols, memes, discourse), but also shifts the tectonic plates of social cohesion, shifts

the horizon and parameters of the future. Of course, within the framework of this paper, we will hardly be able to provide a sufficient description and explanation of at least half of the effects and manifestations of the war that have been stated. However, to present some of their model and, most importantly, to give its criminological interpretation, to determine the basic parameters of criminogenic potentials and to highlight strategically important areas of combating war-related crime is a task from the category of possible.

It is quite clear that it would be wrong to unify the characterization of war as a socio-cultural phenomenon for its various participants and actors. Given that in any international armed conflict there is always an aggressor and a victim, the differentiation should be made at least at the level of the relevant basic division. And this, in fact, is one of the first consequences and manifestations of war: it presents a new subjectivity, new types of social actors, social positioning, and identity. They are based on values, attitudes, and motivations. Let's detail the relevant characteristic, first turning to the transformations in society and the victim country. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the victim of aggression is, of course, Ukraine.

I. Sharp and textured differentiation of society.

Yu. V. Orlov speaks about six main social groups that were formed in connection with the beginning of a full-scale war, that is, from February 24, 2022. The basis of their selection - the kind or type, nature of traumatization caused by war, which forms the relevant traumatic story, namely:

1) traumatic combat plot, which involves the category of Ukrainian citizens who are directly involved in hostilities and, accordingly, are victims of combat injuries, death in combat;

2) migration-traumatic plot, which consists of the trajectories of social activities of those who were forced to leave their usual area of residence, acquire the status of either internally displaced persons (about 5.3 million people) or refugees or persons enjoying temporary protection. people), or refugees or persons enjoying temporary protection or other identical legal protection mechanisms for Ukrainian citizens in other countries of the world (about 8 million people), primarily members of the European Union;

3) a passive-traumatic plot, full of trajectories of social activity of individuals and social groups remote from the zone of active hostilities. Their experience of the consequences of the war has a more informational and symbolic context (the so-called witness trauma), the internalization of which activates the psychogenic complex of victimization, assignment of victim status, activation of a set of protective motivations, increased anxiety, in some cases guilt, sublimation, transfer of aggressive energy, at best - volunteering, at worst - hate, tribalism;

4) an occupation-traumatic plot that unfolds in the life of persons who find themselves in the temporarily occupied territories under the rule of the opposing party - the aggressor;

5) a post-occupation-traumatic plot - a counter-example to the previous one, associated with the frustration of collaborators as a result of the de-occupation of the territories of

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Ukraine, the collapse of their hopes for the establishment of the power of the aggressor country;

6) an integrated-traumatic plot, represented by the intertwining of several of the above plots. Victims of this type have a combined collective trauma, which combines and resonates the conflictogenic, criminogenic effects of several types described above (for example, a post-occupation traumatized victim whose close relative was killed in combat on the aggressor's side, etc.).

These social types, special groups of social actors can be conditionally named as "combat Ukraine", "migrant or homeless Ukraine", "rear Ukraine", "occupied Ukraine", "frustrated de-occupied Ukraine". They have different traumatization patterns, which are already evident today through deconsolidation, new contours of anomie, growing anxiety and internal tension due to unequal moral assessments of activities (escape, non-participation in repelling aggression, the desire to profit from the circumstances caused by the war, in particular by renting housing, abuse of humanitarian aid, theft of property on defense orders, evasion of mobilization, corrupt practices around the mobilization process, etc.) These factors are criminogenic, fueling legal nihilism and the deterministic complex of hate crimes based on the internal vector of its direction.

II. Along with differentiation within certain social fractals, there is consolidation.

If we briefly define the state and main characteristics of Ukrainian society since the beginning of Russia's full-scale military invasion, three key words come to mind first: courage, resilience, and solidarity. War is a time of severe challenges for citizens and the state. At the same time, the war has strengthened the civic and patriotic consolidation of Ukrainian society. Of course, external military aggression is a natural factor in the consolidation of any society. But in the case of Ukraine, this is of particular importance, because the precondition for the Russian invasion was a misconception of Ukraine's fundamental regional and identity splits, in particular between the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking West, North, and Center of the country, including Kyiv, and its predominantly Russian-speaking South and East. The Putin regime's strategic miscalculation was, in particular, that the predominantly Russian-speaking residents of the country's East and South would not resist the Russian invasion and would welcome the so-called liberators with flowers. Instead, the invasion had the opposite effect: many residents of these regions, who experienced firsthand the horrors of rocket attacks, killings and destruction brought by the so-called "Russian world," the Russian world, only became more firmly established in their Ukrainian self-identification, and some of them switched from Russian to Ukrainian in their daily communication. For Ukraine, this war is not only about the necessary and just defense of the territorial integrity of the state and its independence. It is about the very existence of the Ukrainian national community and its right to self-determination. At the same time, the existential national and global worldview dimensions of the Russian-Ukrainian war intersect and complement each other. The global significance of this war lies in the clash of two worldviews and policies regarding the future of the global world order, namely whether it will be built in accordance with the universal rules and norms of international law or on the basis of the right of force with the risk of plunging the world into the chaos of escalating
uncontrolled violence and destruction. It is also a global battle between the values of freedom and the principles of democracy against violence and authoritarianism, and it is characteristic that in this clash, Ukraine, supported by leading democratic countries, is an outpost.¹

Such contradictory trends in sociodynamics are explained by its multidimensionality and the possibility of combining two or more opposites into a single whole. The key condition is the presence of a common enemy.

The theoretical and methodological model of war as a socio-cultural phenomenon should be considered in the diachronic dimension of cultural and social, stable and fluid, universal and local, which opens up the possibility of deploying the research model in a cultural and historical context, where it is not always possible to imagine the diversity of the process of civilization development. This makes it possible to analyze the dynamic characteristics of society in the sociocultural context, to trace the prospects for its formation and the possibility of further transformations. It is the philosophical and general scientific principles, approaches, and methods that will ensure the validity of the results of scientific research.²

It is believed that social groups, states, or nations engage in military conflict. A socio-political actor becomes active if it has certain goals and appropriate motivation. The conflict involves the entire sphere of consciousness and emotions: ideas, values, interests, ideologies, etc.³ Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian war was, first of all, a factor in the consolidation of such an entity as the Ukrainian political nation. However, such consolidation is dangerous, because it is based on a common trauma, an attitude of struggle, and hence on resentment. There is a significant threat of a looping of sentimental attitudes, the effectiveness of which makes it impossible to break through into the future, creates significant obstacles to the construction of a positive future based on creative potential, which is restrained and leveled by the neurotic attitude of struggle and sentiment. The rejection of the latter is fraught with the threat of disintegration of social organization, united around the image of the enemy, common losses and burdens. Therefore, a dilemma arises: either to consciously choose a strategy of breaking the resynthetic foundations of sociality and working with a deep anomaly (with all the risks for Ukraine's statehood in the post-conflict period), or to go the way of preserving the neurotic attitude of struggle, including in the post-conflict period, and to loop the time of social transformations.

The trauma of war is an attack on the coherence of time and identity. "If social systems describe themselves as systems of action, they acquire a given freedom of time. Therefore, they must develop structures that can link events and actions. In this function, structures have their primary relation to time, because linking can only be carried out in

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the temporal dimension. In other words, such a form of perception as an "event" forces explication according to the "before" and "after" scheme. Without this "temporal" binding (which cannot be replaced by either a substantive or a social definition of meaning), the system and even the action would disappear altogether with the last event that took place. With any event and action, there is a certain minimum of surprise, namely the removal of what "was before." To this extent, novelty is constitutive of the emergence of action. However, everything new appears, first of all, as a single thing.1

Such an opinion of N. Luhmann includes not only the idea of creating an effective theory of modern society, but also an explanation of how the social order is formed in a certain period of time, reveals the mechanism of mutual influence of the two basic categories of "event" and "action" as a methodological and universal basis for any type of activity. Moreover, the search for the latest means of intercivilizational dialogue is becoming an attributive component of the modern era, but in the real globalized process of unification and integration of communities, one of these methods of collective violent transformation of the world, such as military activity, remains historically unchanged. Accordingly, the analysis of military activity in the context of socio-cultural changes is of undoubted relevance: "the sociocultural features of the state and its identity undergo profound transformations under the influence of globalization, stimulating the blurring of identity, leveling (alignment) of states with all other homogeneous states involved in this process. Moreover, the processes of such leveling are quite deliberate and purposeful, as, for example, in the case of the formation of European identity within the European Union, which is fully supported by the supranational governance structures of the EU."2

The predominant attitude of Ukrainian civic identity and the meanings of Ukrainian belonging have become an important basis for the consolidation and mass resistance of Ukrainian society to Russian military aggression. The attempt to capture the place and meaning of traumatic experience in words, meanings, discourse, and rituals often takes the form of traumatic teleology. The experience of trauma, that is, the experience of loss, of rupture, turns into a narrative matrix that gives the logic of a coherent plot to the fragmented facts of individual or collective biography. In contrast to "trauma as loss," "trauma as plot" is not only a reason to rethink the lost past: trauma sets the general system of narrative coordinates. Specific situations of victims or eyewitnesses acquire the status of authorial positions from which the past is represented and the present is perceived. In this variant of the post-traumatic state, "post" is not an indicator of overcoming what happened ("post" as "after"), but evidence of its insurmountability: biography and identity are impossible outside the story of the trauma experienced. As a result, a neurotic (in some cases, hysterical) attitude of obsessive action is formed, social time cycles, and the desire to constantly relive the trauma situation at both the symbolic and ontological levels (due to a decrease in the ability to symbolize; hence the exacerbation of the sense of injustice in people with post-traumatic stress

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disorder). The socio-temporal cycle, as a result of the attack on openness and the opposite of kairos, represents an attitude of tribalism, the desire for revenge, consolidates the social role of the victim, fuels competing victimhood, and minimizes the chances of reconciliation. The ongoing war in the cyclos makes it impossible to have a dialogue with a real or imaginary enemy.

This brings us to the third socio-cultural phenomenon determined by war - social inadequacy.

**III. The state of social inadequacy** as a result of the narrowing of thinking based on the anxiety of war, the production of systemic effects of the "Socratic execution". By this effect, we mean the development of diachronicity of thinking, its simplification and hypertrophy of defensive consciousness. The name itself refers to the well-known story of the execution of Socrates, an honored citizen of Athens, by a democratic court with the wording "He does not honor the gods and confuses minds". The latter was seen in the Socratic practice of the method of questions and doubts, an attempt to present a multidimensional picture of the world, which was considered politically dangerous in the context of the war with Sparta. This effect, unfortunately, can be observed today in Ukraine, both at the level of lawmaking and at the level of quasi-strategic public administration, including in the military and political sphere, as well as in mass social practices and doxastic thinking. In the philosophy of S. A. Datsiuk's philosophy is called social inadequacy, when thinking is detached from activity and, most importantly, reality.

At the same time, one should also be aware that the aggressor country is actively working on exacerbating the state of inadequacy, imposing components of its own inadequacy, mounting its simulated counter-realities (such as threats from NATO, the formations of the "DPR", "LPR", "independent state Kherson region", etc.) to the media and political agenda in Ukraine. And this is one of the components of the information component of the war.

In the modern typology of information wars, along with financial, economic, diplomatic and political aspects, the sociocultural aspect is also distinguished. Information warfare in the sociocultural sense is the process of deliberately imposing cultural values ("way of life") of one sociocultural organism on another. The object of confrontation is primarily national cultural values (although sometimes the confrontation can also focus on global value markers). Thus, disinformation, anti-Ukrainian propaganda, fakes, racism, revanchism, political, material, and spiritual violence that threaten the national security of our state are spread through various "information channels" of the aggressor country. Ukrainian society is increasingly facing various types of "cyberattacks" by aggressor countries: failures in the provision of electronic services, blocking the work of government agencies, email fitting attacks, cybercrime, violation of data integrity and confidentiality, information and psychological pressure on the

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1 Hula R. V., Perederii I. H., Sazhko V. V. “Sociocultural dimension of information wars of the XXI century from the point of view of the place and role of libraries in them”. Bulletin of KhSAC, 60 (2021), 7-23.
population, cyberterrorism, cyberespionage, information expansion into the national information space of the country, etc.\(^1\) Countering Russia's aggressive behavior in cyberspace is especially important. The most powerful team of volunteers was also created, numbering about 300 thousand people, who united for Ukraine's victory in cyberspace. Activists were involved in further attacks on enemy resources, both public and private.

S. V. Sydorenko\(^2\), speaking about the development of digitalization in wartime as a socio-cultural phenomenon, emphasizes that to counter the aggressor, one of the main resources should be used - knowledge and innovation, thereby improving its own economic, political, and military potential. The struggle of Ukrainians for their freedom, independence, and self-identity has acquired new, innovative dimensions, among which digitalization has taken a special place. The latter is currently being implemented through the "State in a Smartphone" program; through confronting the aggressor in cyberspace, as well as through further promoting the development of the IT sector, which fulfills contracts, exports its services, provides foreign exchange earnings, and supports the Ukrainian economy. According to many experts, in the future, Ukraine needs to develop and support the latest information development models that will not only help restore our economy by using economic levers, but also strengthen our economy, but will also strengthen the Ukrainian army, which will help to withstand and restore the borders of Ukraine within the 1991 borders.

IV. Formation of social and temporal fronts, metaphysical lines of struggle for time.

For Ukraine, this war is not only a necessary and just defense of the territorial integrity of the state and its independence. It is about the very existence/survival of the Ukrainian national community and its right to self-determination. At the same time, the existential, national, and global dimensions of the Russian-Ukrainian war intersect and complement each other. The global significance of this war lies in the clash of two worldviews and policies regarding the future of the global world order, namely whether it will be built in accordance with the universal rules and norms of international law or on the basis of the right of force with the risk of plunging the world into the chaos of escalating uncontrolled violence and destruction. It is also a global battle between the values of freedom and the principles of democracy against violence and authoritarianism, and it is characteristic that in this clash, Ukraine, supported by leading democratic countries, is an outpost.\(^3\)

Russia's war against Ukraine is a war of the past against the future, of slow time against fast time, of epimetheism against prometheism. The clash of civilizations, which S. Huntington convincingly and extensively substantiated, manifested itself not only and

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not so much between the civilizations of the East, the global South and the West, but also barbarism, authoritarianism, cynical conformism and modern fascism against the democratic world, autocracy against democracy, the existence of aggressive unfreedom against freedom.

V. War as a new language and a changed acoustic space.

First of all, we are talking about the formation of a specific memetic field that denotes events, states, and phenomena as a military one ("two hundredth" - to take a life; "on the shield" - killed; "three hundredth" - wounded; "cotton", "cotton boll" - explosions on the territory controlled by the aggressor; "orc", "pig" - a Russian soldier; "chmobik" - a generalized and clumsy, caricatured image of a soldier of the enemy army (derived from the abbreviation of the so-called "partial mobilization" in Russia) "beha" - an infantry fighting vehicle; "hit" - a shell, missile or other ammunition hitting a certain object or area, etc.), as well as non-military, but of a military contextual nature ("rashist" - a supporter of the "Russian world" ideology; IDP - internally displaced person, TRC - territorial recruitment center, "evaders" - persons who evade mobilization for conscription, etc.) Currently, we can talk about discursive networks that describe the realities of martial law. Some of them are emotionally neutral, representing a discursive alternative to other terms that could be used to describe the relevant phenomena and events. However, the other part has a negative emotional load, characterized either as hate speech or as dehumanizing language practices that remove the burden of responsibility and reduce the effectiveness of deterrence in the mechanism of violent behavior, including criminal behavior.

In general, dehumanization should be considered as a separate socio-cultural shift in the structure of morality and everyday discursive practices, which is:

- a) on the one hand, a manifestation of the emotion of hatred, disdain for the aggressor, a source of physical and mental trauma;
- b) on the other hand, a consequence of getting used to death and violence in the context of war. Unfortunately, war makes you get used to the daily background of losses, deaths, shelling, and destruction. And this may not leave its mark on the mass consciousness. These effects will have to be dealt with for some time after the end of the armed conflict and should be taken into account when developing strategies and tactics of transitional justice, its criminological forecasting and prevention of frontline crime, hate crimes, and a broad general criminal violent trail.

As for the acoustic space, it is special in its own way: explosions (exits, arrivals, explosions of mines, artillery shells, rockets, missiles), drones, air raid sirens, etc. An alarming silence is a new phenomenon for people with experience in combat operations. The acoustic manifestations of war have their own, subtle but powerful impact on the individual and collective psyche, and can act as triggers for people with post-traumatic stress disorder, stimulate anxiety, and determine overall aggressiveness.

VI. A new commemorative culture around the immortalization of war victims and mourning for the dead (burial ceremonies, commemorations, commemorations with emotionally resonant music, symbols, etc.) On the one hand, this culture is understandable, natural, and in demand. On the other hand, it deepens, exacerbates, and
preserves the motives of vengefulness, desire for retribution, resentment, in other words, everything that has aggressive potential and the energy of struggle. The longer the armed conflict lasts, the more difficult it will be to get out of it, to transition to peaceful life and coexistence with ethnic Russians and those who share the same language and region of residence. A special category includes supporters of the "Russian world" and collaborators who have found themselves and will continue to find themselves in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian authorities after the complete de-occupation of the lands seized by the aggressor. The issue of reconciliation will acquire not an abstract but a concrete, applied meaning related to the prevention of violent crimes.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion of this research is that war has an irreparable impact on the environment and the population as a whole. Its impact can be felt in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres, as well as affecting relations between countries at the international level. There are six basic components associated with the phenomenon of war. First, there is a sharp and textured differentiation of society associated with the reactions of different groups to war. Second, war creates trauma that affects social consolidation and national identity. Third, social incompetence develops due to narrowing of thinking and a mismatch with reality. Fourth, war involves a struggle between past and future and freedom and unfreedom. Fifth, war produces a new language that can be emotionally neutral or negative. Finally, there is also a new culture of commemoration associated with memorializing the victims of war, but it also exacerbates the desire for revenge and hatred, which complicates future reconciliation. All of these components illustrate the negative effects that war has on populations and relations between nations.

The implication of this conclusion is that war not only has a direct impact on the environment and populations involved in the conflict, but also causes widespread impacts across different aspects of human life and relations between nations. Furthermore, there needs to be greater efforts to understand and address the long-term impacts of war in building stable and sustainable post-conflict societies.
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