

TUAN GURU AS CAMPAIGNERS: POLITICAL PLAYERS AND SELF INTERESTED LEADERS?

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ABSTRAK

Tulisan ini mengkaji para tuan guru Banjar yang terlibat dalam kampanye pemilihan kepala daerah (pilkada) di Kalimantan Selatan. Dengan pilkada gubernur 2005 sebagai studi kasus, penulis ingin menguji apakah para tuan guru tersebut merupakan pemimpin masyarakat dengan kepentingan pribadi semata. Studi ini juga meneliti sejauhmana para ulama Banjar ini mau terlibat dalam kampanye dan apa yang menjadi pertimbangan-pertimbangan mereka. Para ulama yang menjadi narasumber adalah mereka yang dilibatkan, baik secara langsung ataupun tidak, dalam usaha menarik suara pemilih oleh empat dari lima pasangan calon yang bersaing saat itu. Penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa tuan guru yang diteliti memilih cara yang berbeda dalam membantu calon mereka. Ada yang berkampanye begitu rajin di berbagai ajang dan forum baik yang resmi untuk kampanye atau tidak, namun ada pula membatasi diri hanya pada acara-acara tertentu. Mereka mempunyai motif dan pertimbangan masing-masing baik politik maupun ideologis yang membuat mereka melangkah hingga titik tertentu: mereka berhitung secara rasional. Sebagai imbalan atas kesediaan mereka, para calon memberikan sejumlah ganjaran baik untuk pribadi maupun pesantren, pengajian ataupun organisasi yang dipimpin oleh para ulama ini. Penulis menyimpulkan bahwa tuan guru Banjar yang turut serta berkampanye tidak hanya mengusung kepentingan pribadi.

Keywords: *Tuan guru, pilkada*, campaign, political calculations, political gains.

Introduction

The role of *ulama* in elections for regional heads varies from place to place. In the 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada* in South Kalimantan, *tuan guru* acted as campaigners, not as candidates or political playmakers. Ben Hillman's observation (2005) succinctly describes their function as 'useful assistants' to mobilise support and to make the candidates' political performances lively.

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Tuan guru, of course, were not the only people the candidates counted on for mobilisation.

This article discusses the various activities of *tuan guru* to help the campaigns of their candidates. It shows the differences in terms of the timing and frequency of *tuan guru* involvement. I conclude that the *tuan guru* are rational and active political players who calculate the benefit and harm of participating in campaigns.

Moreover, I look at the rewards given to *tuan guru* by the candidates and then question who are the ultimate beneficiaries : the *tuan guru* and their families or the broaden Muslim community. In effect, I seek to evaluate whether the *tuan guru* act primarily out of self interest, or in the interests of the communities they represent, as they themselves would argue.

Nahdlatul Ulama provides examples of *kiai* who enriched themselves and also *kiai* who used the wealth gained from politics for advancement of the institutions or communities that they led. In his discussion about corruption within NU in the 1950s, Fealy (1998) cited the example of Kiai Munir Abisudjak, who lived a lavish lifestyle while responsible for managing many of NU's assets. According to Fealy, Kiai Munir later sold off many of the organisation's assets or transferred them into his private possessions, which led NU members to depict him as 'the *kiai* who was ruined by money'. The Kiai Munir case shows that Islamic scholars can act in a self-interested way. In contrast, other accounts suggest that *kiai* distribute money that they raise for scholarships, for their students who establish new *pesantren*, and primarily, for their *pesantren*'s development. In such cases, *ulama* are community-oriented people.

In this article, I argue that the rewards resulting from *tuan guru* involvement in the *pilkada* campaign benefited both *tuan guru* and their institutions. Thus, the *tuan guru* do not act purely out of self interest. I must also say that this study represents a preliminary examination of these issues, and therefore, it is not comprehensive. Nonetheless, I believe that the data provided does offer some initial information that will hopefully spur deeper research on this issue.

The activities of *tuan guru* in campaign

In general, *tuan guru* engaged in three types of activities to help their candidates. To begin with, they participated actively in campaign events by leading prayers or giving talks. Secondly, they encouraged their pupils, outside

official campaign events, to vote for their candidates. Finally, they supported the candidates by making statements of support or by lobbying other leaders to join the effort.

However, not every *tuan guru* undertook all three activities during the *pilkada* campaign. Some participated in campaign events but did not make any statement of support in newspapers, for instance. Others supported particular candidates personally, but at the same time, recommended their neighbours elect candidates whom they perceived to be the most decent and generous, even if that was someone different from the candidate of the *tuan guru*. Moreover, some *tuan guru* limited the campaign events that they attended, for example, to only those in their own locality. Furthermore, some *tuan guru* declined to appear in ‘open’ campaign functions such as large rallies or parades, although they diligently participated in the ‘closed’ campaign.

The ‘open’ campaign refers to the campaign held between the 13th and 26th June 2005. The ‘closed’ campaign refers to the campaign events before that. The official term for the open campaign was ‘the campaign’ (*kampanye*) and for the closed campaign, ‘the socialisation’ (*sosialisasi*). Both periods consisted of announcing candidacies, making promises and attracting the voters through various means. What made *sosialisasi* different from *kampanye*, according to the electoral commission in South Kalimantan, was the absence of any mention of a candidate’s number on the ballot (*nomor urut calon*) and of any invitation to vote. Another difference is in the number of people involved: in the *kampanye*, thousands of people were mobilised to attend campaign events, which were thus often a show of power, while *sosialisasi* events consisted of small gatherings with particular communities or groups of people.

I use ‘closed’ and ‘open’ campaigns interchangeably with ‘*sosialisasi*’ and ‘*kampanye*’ because some *tuan guru* used them when explaining their involvement. In reality, the candidates used every chance to invite people to vote for them although in the *sosialisasi* phase they would employ indirect language. Thus, instead of saying ‘please, vote for us’, they would say ‘please, remember us when you make your vote’. In practice, there was little substantial difference between the *sosialisasi* and *kampanye* periods of the campaign.

In order to illustrate how individual *tuan guru* had their own particular ways of supporting the candidates, I give below a number of examples from campaigns of four teams of candidates. After that, I will explain the reasons behind the different approaches in a separate section.

The supporters of Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan NB (the 2R team)

Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff represents a highly active *tuan guru* campaigner. Not only did he participate throughout Rudy and Rosehan's open campaign in June 2005, he also accompanied Rudy for four months of *sosialisasi* in thirteen districts. He gave speeches containing a combination of religious and social concerns such as the widespread nature of corruption, while slipping in praise for Rudy and Rosehan, who were known as the 2R team because of the combination of their first initials. For instance, he said jokingly that '2R' also stands for *Rahman* and *Rahim*, two names of God meaning respectively the Lord of Mercy and the Giver of Mercy.

Importantly, Habib Ali served as a counter balance to the Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe team (the 2U team) who invited many *habaib* to their campaign events or to join their campaign team. The physical appearance of Habib Ali in Rudy's campaigns was a statement: support from the descendants of Prophet Muhammad was not the monopoly of the 2U team.

Guru Supian, the then Rais Syuriah (head of the *ulama* council) of the Banjarmasin branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, was another campaigner for Rudy and Rosehan. In contrast to Habib Ali, he is an example of a *tuan guru* who was cautious in his involvement in the *pilkada* campaign. He rejected three other campaign teams that approached him and his participation in Rudy's campaign was very limited. He talked only at two *pengajian* intended as *sosialisasi* events for the 2R team in Tambarangan (Tapin district) and Gadung (HST district), both of which were far away from his home. He claimed, however, that he had several friends in those areas, which means that he did not speak to an audience of complete strangers. Finally, for someone whose nominees won the *pilkada*, he did not look very enthusiastic when recounting his part in the victorious story to me.

The supporter of Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar

Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, the head of Nurul Muhibbin, Barabai, is a very good example of a *tuan guru* who was involved in many aspects of the closed campaign but did not participate in the open campaign. He accompanied Ismet and Habib Aboe socializing their candidacies in his own town. This means he showed up with his candidates in the area where his pupils resided. He warmly hosted the candidates in his home while they were in Barabai. This was not a new practice as Habib Aboe Bakar had, since 1999,

always stayed there if he had a campaign function in Barabai. This consistent gesture carried an important message for Guru Bakhiet's followers: their *tuan guru* continued to support the 2U team despite the approaches of other candidates. Moreover, Guru Bakhiet gave an interview to a journalist who then reported him swearing before God to 'fully support the *ulama-umara* team' and giving justifications for that. In addition, before this interview took place, he lobbied the head of Pesantren Ibnul Amin, where he had studied three years previously, to support his candidates. Confident of getting his teacher's support, he mentioned in the interview that the *tuan guru* joined him in backing the Ismet-Habib Aboe team.

Despite all of his supportive gestures, Guru Bakhiet did not participate in the open campaign of the 2U team in Barabai. He was neither cautious like Guru Supian, nor was he fully involved like Habib Ali. Guru Bakhiet's place was somewhere in between those *tuan guru*.

The supporters of Gusti Iskandar and Hafiz Anshary (Golkar's nominees)

Guru Abdussyukur was a typical elderly *tuan guru* who was affiliated with a political party. He participated only in the functions held in his district, Banjar. As reported by the *Kalimantan Post*, Guru Syukur led the opening prayer signaling the start of the open campaign. In the other field reports of the Iskandar-Hafiz team's campaign, there was no mention of him. It is highly unlikely that a journalist would omit a big name like his from a report should he have been present. Guru Khalilurrahman and Guru Hamdan Khalid of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) took a similar approach to him on this matter; they only attended the open campaign conducted in their respective areas, Martapura and Amuntai.

As a Golkar affiliated *tuan guru*, Guru Syukur participated in Golkar's general meetings and supported its political decisions regarding the *pilkada*. For example, prior to the open campaign period, on 5 June he delivered a speech at a large Golkar convention urging the consolidation of the party machinery in the run-up to the *pilkada*. In the speech, he asserted his ongoing loyalty to Golkar and urged the party officials and cadres to work together so that Golkar's nominees would achieve victory. On another occasion, Guru Syukur spoke out about the side he took in this *pilkada*. The event I refer to here is the one in which Guru Syukur called a press conference to clarify news reports depicting him giving backing to other candidates, and therefore, walking away

from Golkar's nominees. Guru Syukur was consistent in his political choices and denied the claim made by the other candidates that he had supported them. The fact that he made this public is a form of supportive activities. While the public had known about Guru Syukur's siding with Golkar for a long time, the controversy provided him with an opportunity to renew, or rather, reassert his political consistency.

Another campaigner for the Iskandar and Hafiz team was Guru Nanang Gayam (pseudonym). Guru Nanang was a contrast to Guru Syukur, even though they supposedly supported the same gubernatorial candidates. He was not a Golkar activist, although as a public servant working in the New Order period he used to vote for Golkar. His involvement in the *pilkada* campaign was more in terms of providing services rather than being driven by party identification like Guru Syukur. One indication of this was that he felt disappointed when receiving only two envelopes, containing his honoraria, for talking on three occasions at *sosialisasi* events.

Guru Nanang advised his neighbors to support the Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan team. This is definitely not the kind of attitude one would expect from a supporter, or someone who owed a debt of gratitude. He argued that the 2R candidates made a real contribution, in the form of donations, to the *langgar* and the Islamic kindergarten (TK Al-Qur'an) in the neighborhood. It is wrong however, to conclude that this *tuan guru* was inconsistent or had no principles. In fact, he had and that was 'voting for those who did real favors or made contributions to you'. As the Golkar nominees did nothing in particular for this neighborhood, he felt it was wrong to ask the residents to vote for them.

The supporters of Sjachriel Darham

Guru Ahmad Bakeri was the most widely known *tuan guru* supporter of Sjachriel Darham. He left Golkar, in which he used to be a member of the council of advisers, after the party refused to nominate Sjachriel as its gubernatorial candidate. Sjachriel had done a lot for his Pesantren and Guru Bakeri appeared to understand that his interests would be better served by Sjachriel than Golkar. Guru Bakeri also thought that his position in Golkar as an adviser was useless, because his attempt to lobby the Golkar leader, H. Sulaiman HB to nominate Sjachriel was denied.

Guru Bakeri acted as the official campaigner attending all of Sjachriel's eight open campaign functions in June 2005. He delivered religious sermons just as Habib Ali did for Rudy and Rosehan's campaign. Sjachriel's functions put a heavy emphasis on Guru Bakeri's sermons, which invariably contained messages to vote for Sjachriel. Moreover, Guru Bakeri also sent similar messages when he lectured in his weekly *pengajian*. This demonstrated his staunch support for Sjachriel. Angered by this, the other teams reported him to the Panwas *pilkada* (the official but ad hoc committee monitoring the conduct of the *pilkada*) for violating a rule, i.e. campaigning outside the official schedule. Guru Bakeri was reprimanded by the head of the Panwas *pilkada*. There were no further protests after that, but his students in al-Mursyidul Amin knew very well that their kiai wanted them to vote for Sjachriel. He told them to do so.

Tuan guru calculations

The above examples clearly show that *tuan guru* differed when helping their candidates. They all participated in election campaigns, but their enthusiasm and the commitment, as shown by how often they participated and the way they promoted the candidates, varied markedly. Here, I offer some explanations for the different approaches of *tuan guru*.

First, *tuan guru* were aware of the uneasiness and to a lesser extent, disapproval, of some Muslims regarding the involvement of the *ulama* in politics. They personally were probably aware of the arguments against their becoming involved. However, since the involvement of *tuan guru* in electoral campaigns was not unprecedented, and because some *tuan guru* saw the *pilkada* as a political or economic opportunity, they jumped in anyway. However, to deal with the fallout of this disapproval, they limited the kind of events they participated in and thus, minimized the exposure of their involvement. The best example of this is Guru Supian who agreed to speak only in the closed campaign of the Rudy and Rosehan team held out of town. To a lesser degree, we can also see this in the case of Guru Bakhiet who did not attend the open campaign of the Ismet and Habib Aboe team, although he made supportive efforts in the closed campaign before that. The open campaign allows a greater exposure because thousands of people attend it and it gets media coverage. It would be very difficult to control what people think or what media say about the appearance of a *tuan guru*.

On the other hand, if *tuan guru* thought that their involvement was entirely justifiable, they did not mind the exposure. It is even possible that they were happy with the media coverage. Guru Bakeri felt that his participation in Sjachriel's campaign was an observance of a moral obligation, which is to help a person who had done him favours. This explanation also applies for Guru Syukur whose affiliation with Golkar was foremost for the development of Pesantren Darussalam. For them, participating in the open campaign was not something to be avoided. They were not afraid of making bold statements in such events either. For instance, Guru Bakeri once stated, "unlike some other *ulama* who concealed their choices in the *pilkada* or were hypocrites, I am frank about mine and that is to vote for Sjachriel". Guru Syukur, likewise, repeatedly declared his loyalty to Golkar on various occasions during *pilkada* time.

Moreover, if the *tuan guru* were natural politicians or wanted to have political careers in the future, their involvement was more than just attending the open campaign. Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff, the above noted most diligent *tuan guru* campaigner, was a good example of this. He and another *tuan guru*, Guru Husni Nurin who is a rising PKB politician, hardly missed any *sosialisasi* function of the Rudy and Rosehan team as well. The motivation of Habib Ali to support Rudy was in expectation of political advancements that he did not get from PKS. On the other hand, Guru Husni took over the position of Rosehan in the provincial parliament when the latter was elected as the deputy governor.

But if the *tuan guru* were elderly and had no more political ambition, they would not be bothered to become involved too much in the campaign. Attending the open campaign of their candidates in their respective areas was enough to show their support. Guru Hamdan Khalid of Amuntai and Guru Khalilurrahman of Martapura are examples of this. In 2005, Guru Hamdan was 69 years old, the Rais Syuriah of the South Kalimantan branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, and was not interested in becoming a local or national Member of Parliament. Similarly, Guru Khalilurrahman was in his mid-sixties, had just finished his service as a PKB national parliamentarian in 2004 and was in charge of the Dewan Syuriah of the South Kalimantan branch of PKB until 2007. These *tuan guru* had occupied the positions that many *ulama* politicians would like to reach. Victory in the *pilkada* was not like a big fish that they would work hard to catch.

Finally, when a *tuan guru* campaigned for honoraria and thought that his candidates did not appreciate his work, it was not surprising that his personal

choice contradicted his advice to his community, as in the case of Guru Nanang Gayam. He, to recap, campaigned for Iskandar and Hafiz but told his neighbours to vote for Rudy and Rosehan – a good example of pragmatism.

Tuan guru campaigners had their own ideals and ambitions and they acted accordingly. They agreed to become involved in the *pilkada* campaign to help particular candidates but set their own boundaries. They made conscious choices about how and when they showed political support. They made calculations just like their candidates.

Who benefited?

What, then, did *tuan guru* get out of their involvement in the *pilkada* campaign? Were *tuan guru* the only beneficiaries of the gains or did the institutions that they led, *pesantren* or *pengajian*, enjoy the benefits as well? I seek to answer these questions here, in the final part of this article.

Before proceeding to the issue of gains, a brief discussion of contrasting pictures of *ulama* is necessary. Some scholars are skeptical that, when *ulama* generate money from politicians or political involvement, they would use it for their communities. According to this view, *ulama* would enrich themselves and spend the money on a opulent lifestyle. Indeed, as the case of Kiai Munir Abisudjak mentioned earlier suggests, *ulama* could be self-interested. However, one can also find abundant evidence which says otherwise. That is, *ulama* are community-oriented, channeling the money they receive from various sources, including politics, to the needy or to the improvement of the quality of the *ummah*, in general.

The limited scope of this study prevents me from generalising whether *tuan guru* properly use or abuse the money they receive from politicians. What this study does do, however, is illustrate that the involvement of *tuan guru* in the *pilkada* campaign benefited themselves as well as their institutions. We can see this from the rewards given by the candidates. In other words, this study suggests that *tuan guru*, as shown in the 2005 *pilkada*, cannot be categorised simply as self-interested people. However, it is also clear that the money given to them, as honoraria, very likely went into their own pockets because it was intended that this be so. On the other hand, we do not know for sure what they did with it in their own private arrangements.

During the 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada* campaign, the candidates rewarded both the individual *tuan guru* and their institutions, if they had one. Rewards for

the individuals were two in kind: honoraria and 'bonuses'. The bonuses I mean here are additional gifts donated by candidates after they won the *pilkada*. It is worth noting that some rewards were of an individualistic nature so that they could not be directly enjoyed by others. Moreover, the rewards for institutions were normally either untied donations or specific development assistance.

Honoraria

Candidates provided honoraria for *tuan guru* campaigners as they did for other groups of people who helped their campaign, such as the entertainers. This was simply following a normal practice when inviting a *tuan guru* for religious services. The honoraria may not be intended as direct payment for the time, the popularity and the skills of *tuan guru*. Nonetheless, giving honoraria is a practical way of appreciating people's service, which has an economic element.

The amount of honoraria varied and it seemed that the fame of the *tuan guru* was taken into consideration to determine it. A-not-so-popular-preacher like Guru Nanang Gayam, for instance, only received a hundred thousand rupiah per event. In contrast, Sjachriel's team, which held eight functions during the official campaign period, provided ten million rupiah for the famous Guru Ahmad Bakeri. That means a per function honorarium to Guru Bakeri of one and a quarter million rupiah or twelve times the honorarium of Guru Nanang.

Having mentioned this, there is nothing wrong with *tuan guru* receiving honoraria for religious services, let alone from political involvement. There is no teaching that obliges or recommends them to reject payment for dispensing religious services. In fact, they are allowed to use portions of endowment (*waqaf*), if they are trusted to manage it, for basic and dissent spending especially when they cannot work because of taking care of the endowment. They would consider that as God's blessing (*barakah*) upon them for carrying out the propagation of His commands. In other words, making money out of religious service is acceptable, not condemned.

This notion of the acceptability of taking money from religious activities is truer in the case of those *ulama* who prioritise religious education. They believe that religious education is part of the struggle in God's path (*jihad fi sabilillah*). They spend their own money or families' wealth to build schools and struggle to find financial sources to maintain them. Similarly, those *pengajian*

tuan guru, although they do not have financial burdens as much as those heads of *pesantren*, would spend their time to come to different places to give religious sermons. Certainly, one can understand even appreciate their taking money from such activities. That is important for the sustainability of a long-term religious education.

Finally, as *ulama* are symbols of religion, they believe it is important for them to be strong financially to show the strength of religious messages they spread. For *ulama*, being rich is therefore, a necessity. A *tuan guru*'s remark substantially captures this point: "Would the followers believe that an *ulama*'s prayers were being heard if they were poor?!" All these points are to show that an *ulama*'s taking of the money for themselves is not necessarily wrong or bad.

Rewards for institutions

One good example of rewards for a *tuan guru*'s institution was the donation made by Sjachriel to help build a new *musalla* (a prayer house but also a centre of activities) in Guru Bakeri's *pesantren*. The donation was larger than that which Sjachriel and other candidates made to other *pesantren* or houses of worship. Sjachriel gave over 25 million rupiah for the construction of the new *musalla*. This took place close to *pilkada* time and it did not seem to be intended to attract Guru Bakeri's sympathy. Guru Bakeri had already agreed to support Sjachriel in the *pilkada* before the donation was made. Thus it was more a reward for a committed supporter.

Another kind of donation served as a means to win the support of those who might have not made up their minds about the preferred candidates. Examples of this nature were the donations of Sjachriel and of Golkar's candidates to Guru Bakhiet's Nurul Muhibbin, or of Rudy and Rosehan to the Islamic kindergarten in Guru Nanang Gayam's neighborhood. Guru Bakhiet told me that Sjachriel and Iskandar donated five million rupiah each, and Guru Nanang informed me that Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan donated 2.5 million rupiah each. The donations were not intended as rewards, as the recipient communities made no commitment to vote for them. The money was an example of the gains that could accrue through a willingness to open the door for politicians.

Pesantren Darussalam of Martapura is a good example of a *pesantren* which benefited because one of its leaders supported the winning candidates, Rudy and Rosehan. Guru Khalilurrahman, in addition to being a PKB leader,

was second in charge of Darussalam in 2005. After the 2R team won the *pilkada*, the *pesantren* got easy approval for funding proposals submitted to the governor and deputy governor's offices. This, perhaps, was also because Rudy Ariffin had a prior relationship with the *pesantren's* leaders before he assumed the governorship. He used to be a district head (*bupati*) in Martapura, the city where Darussalam is situated.

The South Kalimantan Nahdlatul Ulama also benefited from the victory of the Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan team. NU was quietly involved in the *pilkada* campaign and many individual NU *tuan guru* and officials joined the 2R campaign team. For the organization, Rudy, as the governor, approved a monthly subsidy amounting to five million rupiah or five times the size of the subsidy given to NU by the previous governor. Getting money from the government to finance the organization is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for NU to give up partisan politics. NU *tuan guru*, moreover, were treated favourably by the winning candidates. Every year Rudy and Rosehan would pay for their trips to the *haul* events in East and Central Java, including the *uang saku* (money for food and incidentals during the trip). To my knowledge, previous governors did not provide this kind of free service for a group of *tuan guru*, although a future one may imitate it.

Bonuses

As noted above, only the winning candidates gave bonuses; the defeated had obviously no incentive to do so. Many of *tuan guru* supporters of Rudy and Rosehan did not lead *pesantren*. They were preachers, some more popular than others, who routinely gave Islamic sermons in their areas. Unsurprisingly, the nature of the rewards given to them was individualistic.

Habib Ali Haidar received a car from Rudy Ariffin, a gift given only to him and Guru Bahran Jamil. Then, in 2007, Habib Ali was appointed a deputy in the Rudy-led PPP, with a newly created portfolio to handle, namely youth and religion. Rusydiansyah Asnawie, then the executive chairman of South Kalimantan NU, was appointed deputy as well, at the same time.

Furthermore, Habib Ali became a close associate of Rudy. Two instances make this point apparent. First, Habib Ali told me that Guru Bakeri once offered him a position on the Mesjid Sabilal Muhtadin managing board as his attempt, in Habib Ali's opinion, to keep his own position there after the defeat of Sjachriel, Guru Bakeri's patron. Habib Ali politely rejected this offer but

promised to talk with Rudy about the future of Guru Bakeri in Mesjid Sabilal. If this story is true, it indicates that Guru Bakeri considered Habib Ali a close associate of Rudy. Second, Rudy agreed to join the routine pilgrimage to the tomb of Guru Zaini Sekumpul organised by Habib Ali Haidar with a group of spirited youth. Guru Zaini's tomb in Martapura is usually visited every second month as part of Habib Ali's program to visit holy sites around the province. While Rudy can certainly choose to do this pilgrimage whenever he wants, he decided to join Habib Ali's group. This is another sign of the good relationship between them.

Guru Supian was given a free hajj pilgrimage in 2006. He was sent as a regional supervisor for hajj pilgrims whose expenses were paid by the regional government. The authority to appoint the provincial supervisors rests with the governor and his deputy. In addition, Supian's son was an awardee of the travel grant to Yemen, a program initiated by Habib Ali and applied by the Rudy administration. The grant, as received by Guru Supian, amounted to a generous twenty eight million rupiah and was given by the provincial government to seven students.

The other two *tuan guru* supporters of 2R, Guru Khalilurrahman and Guru Hamdan Khalid received nothing notable, so far as I could discover. They would however, highly likely be invited to join the *haul* trips as they are prominent NU *tuan guru*.

Concluding remarks

The individualistic nature of the rewards reflects an acknowledgment on the part of the candidates that they feel indebted to *tuan guru* personally. It may also indicate their attempt to entertain *tuan guru* for the purposes of future elections. *Tuan guru* will have vested interests in continuing to support those 'kind and generous' politicians. This was the case with Guru Bakeri, for instance. However, there is room to believe that the politicians do respect *ulama*, and the special treatment of them is simply a reflection of the social status of *ulama*. There were a couple of *tuan guru*, who reportedly supported other candidates, but were invited by Rudy and Rosehan to join the *haul* trips, for example.

The individualistic nature of the rewards also means that the community hardly enjoys any benefit from them. The trips to *haul* events to Java or free pilgrimage could not be shared. Similarly, the car and the position in a party

were possessed by the *tuan guru*. However, outcomes of the rewards such as the experiences gained during the trips and the use of positions and facilities could benefit the community of *tuan guru*. *Tuan guru* need to make that the case if they want to hold on to the respect and allegiance of their followers.

I have discussed the campaign activities of *tuan guru* and the gains generated out of their involvement in the *pilkada*. I argue that *tuan guru* calculated their steps in showing support for the candidates. This means that they chose the type of campaign functions they wanted to attend, i.e. open or closed campaign, and how frequent they could participate. I suggest that *tuan guru* based their calculations on reasons such as the disapproval of some Muslims to the political participation of *ulama*, *tuan guru*'s individual ambitions and their views on how politics should serve their interests.

Moreover, *tuan guru* were rewarded for their participation in campaign both as individuals and as the leaders of particular institutions. I have pointed out that *tuan guru* received honoraria intended for them as individuals. I also have illustrated that the organizations or institutions that *tuan guru* lead also got facilitations or donations from the candidates. As such, the involvement in the *pilkada* generally serves *tuan guru*'s interests and benefited their institutions. Therefore, the picture of *ulama* as acting entirely out of self-interest does not match with the experience of the *tuan guru*.

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