



RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND THE COVID 19 PANDEMIC IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN

Irfan Noor¹, Husnul Khotimah², Mariatul Asiah³

^{1,2,3}, Universitas Islam Negeri Antasari Banjarmasin

Email: irfanloor@uin-antasari.ac.id¹, husnulkhatimah@uin-antasari.ac.id²,
mariatulasiah.hmz@gmail.com³

Abstract

The response of religious people to the Covid-19 pandemic a few years ago is one of the issues that has attracted the attention of many scholars. This is because many scholars emphasize that the Covid-19 pandemic issue is not only about health issues, but also involves social and religious dimensions. This research is very important to do considering the religiosity of the people of South Kalimantan, where religion is the basis of their daily social life. In this context, researchers want to conduct research with a focus on "Response and Fragmentation of Religious Authority". With this focus, this research wants to explore how the dynamics of religious authorities in South Kalimantan responded to Covid-19 a few years ago in South Kalimantan.

Keywords: *Response, Fragmentation, Religious Authority.*

Abstrak

Respon umat beragama terhadap pandemi Covid-19 beberapa tahun lalu menjadi salah satu isu yang menarik perhatian banyak cendekiawan. Hal ini dikarenakan banyak sarjana yang menekankan bahwa isu pandemi Covid-19 tidak hanya menyangkut masalah kesehatan, tetapi juga menyangkut dimensi sosial dan keagamaan. Penelitian ini sangat penting untuk dilakukan mengingat religiusitas masyarakat Kalimantan Selatan, di mana agama menjadi dasar dalam kehidupan sosial sehari-hari. Dalam konteks ini, peneliti ingin melakukan penelitian dengan fokus "Respon dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan". Dengan fokus tersebut, penelitian ini ingin mengeksplorasi bagaimana dinamika otoritas keagamaan di Kalimantan Selatan dalam merespons Covid-19 yang terjadi beberapa tahun lalu di Kalimantan Selatan.

Kata kunci: Respon, Fragmentasi, Otoritas Keagamaan.

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic that hit the world in early 2020 lasted up to three years and became a pandemic with a tremendous impact that occurred in the modern era.¹ This outbreak became a pandemic that spread very quickly to all parts of the world and took many lives.

¹ <https://covid19.who.int>, "WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard," July 18, 2020, <https://covid19.who.int>.

In addition to the country where the virus was first discovered, Indonesia is also one of the countries that is not spared from the spread of this virus. In Indonesia, the virus started with two people identified in Depok on March 2, 2020.² Since it was announced in early March, there has been a remarkable increase of about 79.5% within two months.³ President Joko Widodo declared the COVID-19 pandemic a national non-natural disaster in Indonesia through Presidential Decree Number 12 of 2020. When summing up the positive cases of the coronavirus in 2020 from several regions in Indonesia, South Kalimantan is included in the fifth highest province with the most cases of covid-19. The local government then announced the first positive case on March 22, 2020. From this first case until July 8, 2020, the number of positive cases of COVID-19 in South Kalimantan increased rapidly to reach 3. 818 positive cases and 1. 549 positive cases, 323 recovered, and 128 died.⁴

Based on emergency considerations of the wider spread of the virus, the Banjarmasin City Government implemented the PSBB for 10 days starting from May 7-21, 2020 and continuing again until May 31, 2020. Then the Banjarmasin City Government temporarily suspended the PSBB for 10 days and extended it twice because the PSBB was deemed ineffective in suppressing the number of coronavirus transmissions. In South Kalimantan, apart from Banjarmasin City, there are three other regions that also implement PSBB, namely Banjarbaru City, Banjar Regency, and Barito Kuala Regency.

With the increasing spread of the virus and various efforts made by the government such as the implementation of PSBB and strict health protocols. The spread of the virus in South Kalimantan is actually increasing. According to several media sources, this fact is due to the low or lack of discipline of South Kalimantan residents to comply with health protocols during the implementation of PSBB.⁵ So then the expression appeared, "Banjar people are unruly (*mucil*)" and "OKP (*Orang Kada Pama'asian*)".⁶ These two terms describe the social behavior of a group of people

² <https://www.cnnindonesia.com>, "Jokowi Umumkan Dua WNI Positif Corona Di Indonesia," February 3, 2020, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200302111534-20-479660/jokowi-umumkan-dua-wni-positif-corona-di-indonesia>.

³ Abdullah Sidiq Notonegoro, "Sains Melampaui Politik Dan Agama," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 110.

⁴ <https://corona.kalselprov.go.id>, "Covid 19 Kalimantan Selatan: Update," July 8, 2020, <https://corona.kalselprov.go.id/>.

⁵ <http://jejakbanua.com>, "Banyak Warga Tak Disiplin, Haris: Peran Tim KIE Semakin Dimasifkan," Mei 2020, <http://jejakbanua.com/2020/05/23/banyak-warga-tak-disiplin-haris-peran-tim-kie-semakin-dimasifkan/>.

⁶ Mujiburrahman, "Polisinya Adalah Kita Sendiri," *Banjarmasin Post*, June 8, 2020, sec. Jendela, <https://banjarmasin.tribunnews.com/2020/06/08/polisinya-adalah-kita-sendiri>.

who are disobedient, unwilling to be disciplined, and indifferent to the implementation of COVID-19 control measures by local governments.

Scientists have also found interesting findings that the COVID-19 pandemic problem is not only a health problem, but also has an impact on other social aspects.⁷ One of the interesting things that needs to be addressed is how religion is intertwined and plays a role in the Covid-19 pandemic problem. In fact, this is also an in-depth study conducted by various researchers.⁸ Arobi and Nazifa's study explains that while religion plays an important role in disaster preparedness, it can also be a force that prevents adherents from participating in disaster response activities.⁹ In addition, it was also stated that religious authorities stated that *inductivized religion* seems to be a realistic solution in compromising the conflict between religious deductive and scientific inductive reasoning in responding to the pandemic.¹⁰

⁷ Yusuf Setyadi, "Social And Security Impact Of Covid-19 Outbreak In West Kalimantan Based On The Police Law Perspective," *Syariah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Pemikiran* 20, no. 1 (July 2, 2020): 14–27, <https://doi.org/10.18592/sjhp.v20i1.3771>; Muchammad Bayu Tejo Sampurno, Tri Cahyo Kusumandyoko, and Muh Ariffudin Islam, "Budaya Media Sosial, Edukasi Masyarakat, Dan Pandemi COVID-19," *SALAM: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Syar-i* 7, no. 5 (April 14, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.15408/sjsbs.v7i5.15210>; Budi Yanti et al., "Community Knowledge, Attitudes, And Behavior Towards Social Distancing Policy As Prevention Transmission Of Covid-19 In Indonesia," *Jurnal Administrasi Kesehatan Indonesia* 8, no. 2 (2020): 4–14; Wenjun Cao et al., "The Psychological Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic on College Students in China," *Psychiatry Research* 287 (May 1, 2020): 112934, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2020.112934>; Azmil Abidah et al., "The Impact of Covid-19 to Indonesian Education and Its Relation to the Philosophy of 'Merdeka Belajar,'" *Studies in Philosophy of Science and Education* 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 38–49, <https://doi.org/10.46627/sipose.v1i1.9>; Stephen M. Modell and Sharon L. R. Kardia, "Religion as a Health Promoter During the 2019/2020 COVID Outbreak: View from Detroit," *Journal of Religion and Health*, June 16, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-020-01052-1>.

⁸ Masdar Hilmy and Khoirun Niam, "Winning the Battle of Authorities: The Muslim Disputes Over the Covid-19 Pandemic Plague in Contemporary Indonesia," *QIJIS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)* 8, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 293–326, <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v8i2.7670>; Nur Hidayah, "Dari Jabariyah, Ke Qadariyah, Hingga Islam Progresif: Respons Muslim Atas Wabah Corona Di Indonesia," *SALAM: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Syar-i* 7, no. 5 (April 17, 2020): 423–38, <https://doi.org/10.15408/sjsbs.v7i6.15365>; Falahuddin, "Respon Muhammadiyah Menghadapi Covid-19," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 137–52; Dadang Kuswana, Bambang Qomaruzzaman, and Masmuni Mahatma, "Agama Dan Wabah : Tanggapan Ulama Jawa Barat Atas Covid-19 Tahun 2020," *UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung*, 2020, <http://digilib.uinsgd.ac.id/30780/>; Agus Indiyanto and Arqom Kuswanjono, eds., *Konstruksi Masyarakat Tangguh Bencana* (Bandung-Yogyakarta: Mizan dan Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya (Center for Religious & Cross-cultural Studies) Sekolah Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2012); M. Alkaf, "Agama, Sains, Dan Covid-19: Perspektif Sosial-Agama," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 93–108; Mohammad Zaki Arrobi and Amsa Nadzifah, "Otoritas Agama Di Era Korona: Dari Fragmentasi Ke Konvergensi?," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 197–215; M. Kholis Amrullah, "The South Kalimantan Ulama's Leadership in Covid-19 Pandemic Era," *INNOVATIO: Journal for Religious Innovation Studies* 20, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 111–24, <https://doi.org/10.30631/innovatio.v20i2.111>.

⁹ Mohammad Zaki Arrobi and Amsa Nadzifah, "Otoritas Agama Di Era Korona: Dari Fragmentasi Ke Konvergensi?," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 198.

¹⁰ Hilmy and Niam, "Winning the Battle of Authorities," 296.

Based on the above, it is interesting to highlight what exactly is the phenomenon of fragmentation of religious authorities in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. Because religious factors and religious authorities also play an important role in stemming and dealing with this outbreak. Especially in South Kalimantan Province, where the people are known to be very religious, there are many religious leaders who play an important role in overcoming this disaster, so the study of this authority will be even more interesting if studied more deeply.

Literature Review

Discussions of religious authority in Indonesia have recently captured the attention of many social scientists.¹¹ Long before studies on the phenomenon of religious authority in Indonesia, Jajat Burhanuddin through his study entitled *The Fragmentation of Religious Authority: Islamic Print Media in Early 20th Century Indonesia*.¹² Burhanudin has conducted a serious study on the shift of religious authority in Indonesian Muslim society.

In Burhanuddin's view, this shift has been going on since the end of the 19th century. According to him, the process of consolidation of ulama in Indonesia took place very intensively at the end of the 19th century. It was during this period that there was an increase in the number

¹¹ Jajat Burhanuddin and Ahmad Baedowi, *Transformasi Otoritas Keagamaan: Pengalaman Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama bekerjasama dengan PPIM, UIN Jakarta dan Basic Education Project, Depok, 2003); Marc Gaborieau, "Redefining Religious Authority in South Asian Muslims," in *Varieties of Religious Authority: Changes and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam*, Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, dan Nico JG Kaptein (ISEAS: Singapore, 2010), 1–16; Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G. Kaptein, eds., *Varieties of Religious Authority: Changes and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam* (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2010), <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/varieties-of-religious-authority/67C3BDCE728013CF5E1294CCD99FAB6F>; Nico Kaptein, "The Arab Middle East and Religious Authority in Indonesia," *Tebuireng: Journal of Islamic Studies and Society* 1, no. 1 (December 31, 2020): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.33752/tjiss.v1i1.1170>; Din Wahid, "Challenging Religious Authority: The Emergence of Salafi Ustadhs in Indonesia," *JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM* 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2012): 245–64, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2012.6.2.245-264>; Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia," in *Islam in Southeast Asia: Negotiating Modernity*, Norshahril Saat (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018), 140–63; Norshahril Saat, *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*, ed. Ahmad Najib Burhani (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020); Muzayyin Ahyar and Alfitri Alfitri, "Aksi Bela Islam: Islamic Clicktivism and the New Authority of Religious Propaganda in the Millennial Age in Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 9, no. 1 (May 24, 2019): 1, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v9i1.1-29>; M. Afandi et al., "The New Ustad in Religious Authority: Challenge and Dynamic of Fatwa in the New Media Era," in *Proceedings of the 3rd International Colloquium on Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies, ICIIS 2020, 20-21 October 2020, Jakarta, Indonesia* (Proceedings of the 3rd International Colloquium on Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies, ICIIS 2020, 20-21 October 2020, Jakarta, Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia: EAI, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.20-10-2020.2305167>; Rumadi, "Islam Dan Otoritas Keagamaan," *Walisongo* 20, no. 1 (Mei 2012): 25–53; Hilmy and Niam, "Winning the Battle of Authorities"; Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Najib Burhani, eds., *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS Yusuf Ishak Institute, 2020).

¹² Jajat Burhanudin, "The Fragmentation of Religious Authority: Islamic Print Media in Early 20th Century Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 11, no. 1 (2004): 23–62, <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v11i1.652>.

of pesantrens and tariqahs, the spread of the yellow book, and the strengthening of relations with Makkah. The experience of the ulama as part of the Indonesian Jawi-Muslim community who had lived studying in Mecca became one of the important factors that helped strengthen the authority of the ulama. In this period, the political role of the ulama, as a force against colonialism, can also be seen. Burhanuddin also examines a historical period in which the role of the ulama above began to change, and it began in the early 20th century. In this century, the modernization of Indonesian society, driven by the Dutch colonial Ethical Policy, gave birth to a new urban-based society. This new Muslim society not only lived in a new modern atmosphere, but was also familiar with the idea of *progress*. At the same time, the Jawi community in Makkah also began to change, as they became interested in the ideas of Islamic reform in Cairo, Egypt. The wave of interest in the idea of Islamic reform intensified in the 1920s, giving birth to a new generation of Muslims (young people), who voiced the need for Islamic reform in order to achieve progress. This new generation of Muslims began to shift the traditional role of the ulama in shaping Islamic intellectual discourse in Indonesia. One important evidence of this process is the print media in the form of journals, newspapers and books.¹³

In the next decade, shifting religious authority again became a major issue in public Islam in Indonesia. This cannot be separated from the changes in the religious *landscape of* Indonesian society after the New Order and the strengthening of information technology globally in the world and in Indonesia. In the post-New Order context, Din Wahid has conducted a study entitled *Challenging Religious Authority: The Emergence of Salafi Ustadhs in Indonesia* with a focus on the presence of Salafi ustadz. In this study, Wahid describes how there is contestation between the established power of traditional religious authorities and the newly emerging Salafi ustadz. In this contestation, there is a feeling of threat from this changing trend from the kiai who hold the old religious authority towards Salafi preachers.¹⁴

The study is in line with M. Amin Abdullah's study entitled *Religious Authority in Indonesian Islam: Mainstream Organizations under Threat*,¹⁵ which explains that after the New Order collapsed, there was a transition to democratization and great freedom for the community to more freely express their religious identity. Another situation that is present today is how significant the expansion of digital technology and the internet is among the public. This condition allows Muslim

¹³ Burhanudin, 28–34.

¹⁴ Wahid, "CHALLENGING RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY," 245–62.

¹⁵ M. Amin Abdullah, "Mendialogkan Nalar Agama Dan Sains Modern Di Tengah Pandemi Covid-19," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 11–39.

communities to express their religious attitudes and practices more freely. Thanks to advances in information and communication technology, fringe voices from the Islamic movement, which used to be part of the opposition and were always suppressed by the New Order regime, then more easily articulated their ideas and religious practices.¹⁶

No less interesting is the study conducted by Azhar Ibrahim with the title "*Being Authoritative but No Authority?*" *Muslim Religious Intellectuals in Shaping Indonesian Islam Discourse*. (Ibrahim 2020). Ibrahim shows that this shift in religious authority also extends to the religious authority of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals who have taken part in the New Order era (1966-1998). Their religious role is very significant and has been at the forefront of the renewal of Islamic thought in Indonesia. These figures include Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, Ahmad Syaf'i Maarif, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Kuntowijoyo, Dawam Rahardjo, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Quraish Shihab, Azyumardi Azra, Djohan Effendi, and Masdar F. Mas'udi. These are figures who are described as having scientific authority in the fields of theology, philosophy, fiqh, tafsir, social and politics. However, recently, the thoughts of these figures have been less resonant in the public sphere and have been challenged by conservative groups.¹⁷

In his analysis of the book entitled *New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia* (Saat and Burhani 2020) Norshahril and Burhani explain that there are at least three factors that greatly influence the various contestations today that occur in three Islamic religious arenas, namely: globalization, democratization after the 1998 reform, and the growth of various private television and social media users (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube). These three factors have a strong impact in shaping and animating the construction, contestation, fragmentation, and pluralization of contemporary Indonesian religious authority. In addition, in Islamic teachings, religious authority is never monolithic, and among Sunni Islam, religious authority is always decentralized and contested.¹⁸

Regarding these three factors, Dale F. Eickelman and Anderson long ago in their work entitled *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere*,¹⁹ have argued that *new media*, with its aggressive nature, creates new structures and orders that have a fundamental impact by changing established patterns in people's lives beyond their boundaries, and allows for the dismantling of traditional religious authority. Thus, the emergence of new media makes religious authority

¹⁶ Abdullah, 13–27.

¹⁷ Azhar Ibrahim, "“Being Authoritative But No Authority?” Muslim Religious Intellectuals in Shaping Indonesian Islam Discourse,” in *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*, Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Najib Burhani (ed.) (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020), 28–47.

¹⁸ Saat and Burhani, *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*, 2.

¹⁹ Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, eds., *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007).

fragmented and at the same time new religious authority will emerge. They also argue that the emergence of new religious authorities will shift the role of traditional religious authorities as holders of Islamic discourse.

Even in Peter Mandaville's study, *Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge: Pluralizing Authority in the Muslim World*,²⁰ (Mandaville 2007, 101-15) it has also been explained that religious authority is decentralized and democratized; everyone can contribute to "reshaping religion with their own hands", and it is no longer under the hegemony of the clerics.²¹ The ulama's high understanding and position does not guarantee the respect of the community, regardless of how strong the arguments are. Muslim communities have moved away from traditional authority and now "authority structures are becoming increasingly diffuse, divergent, diverse and translocalized".²²

In recent years, according to Mutohharun Jinan in *New Media Intervention and Impersonalization of Religious Authority in Indonesia*,²³ recent studies on Islamic publics have emphasized the importance of new media in shaping and influencing Muslim behavior in the public sphere. Particularly on how there has been a process of democratization and fragmentation of such publics as a result of the capacity of new media to undermine established dominances such as the state and clerical institutions. The development of increasingly sophisticated technology opens up very wide opportunities for the dynamics of religious authority, as it also has opportunities for all things. Here everyone can easily access knowledge according to their own tastes and needs. Someone who needs an answer to a problem does not have to ask a cleric directly. Religious fatwas are no longer only owned by conventional scholars. Now, everyone can find answers and make decisions based on information available in the media.²⁴

In fact, according to Noorhaidi Hasan, the openness of social media networks requires anyone to take part in determining future religious dialogues. Oral language as a classic medium to understand and recognize each other, has now developed into a written language that can be accessed by anyone, anytime and anywhere. If language as offline social media only has a quadratic role between the speaker (*orator*) and the listener (*audience*), now in the age of globalization of

²⁰ Peter Mandaville, "Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge: Pluralizing Authority in the Muslim World," *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 101–15.

²¹ Mandaville, 102.

²² Mandaville, 102–3.

²³ Mutohharun Jinan, "Intervensi New Media Dan Impersonalisasi Otoritas Keagamaan Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Komunikasi Islam* 3, no. 2 (December 1, 2013): 321–48, <https://doi.org/10.15642/jki.2013.3.2.%p>.

²⁴ Mutohharun Jinan, "New Media Dan Pergeseran Otoritas Keagamaan Islam Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan* 10, no. 1 (2012): 182–83.

science and technology, language as online social media comes with a very complex matrix function. Themes that are being discussed abroad can be followed live from within the country at the same time.²⁵ That means, in the context of recent changes in the religious *landscape*, the main issue that has attracted the attention of many scholars is how there has been a process of democratization and public fragmentation that weakens established dominance, such as the clerical institution.²⁶

The complexity of the issue of religious authority in Islam in particular is indicated by Rumadi in his study of *Islam and Religious Authority*²⁷ as a characteristic of Islam itself. Normatively-theologically, Islam does not recognize the institution of the monarchy as can be found in Judaism (*lā rabbaniyata fi al-Islām*), nor the Papal organization as in Catholicism that controls religious life, including the interpretation of religious teachings. In this case, Islam tends to give the right and space for religious appreciation and understanding to each of its adherents.²⁸ Therefore, as in many countries, Islam in Indonesia does not recognize a single Islamic authority. Islamic authority in Indonesia is spread in various layers, both in religious institutions, state institutions, and local figures. Religious institutions such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Persis have fatwa institutions to provide guidance to their followers on various religious matters. Likewise, the presence of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) through the Fatwa Commission, which regularly issues a number of fatwas.²⁹

Therefore, the study of religious authority is increasingly becoming the main concern of social science scholars, especially when it is related to the issue of religious authority which is associated with the dynamics of the response of religious people to Covid-19. In a study conducted by Zaki Arrobi and Asma Nadzifah, *Religious Authority in the Corona Era: From Fragmentation to Convergence?*³⁰ It is stated that the role of religious authorities, especially Islam, in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia has experienced a lot of pluralization and fragmentation due to various factors, including the presence of various information from social media which is part of the development of information technology that cannot be avoided by religious people today. However, Arrobi and Nadzifah also show the development of convergence between various religious and scientific authorities in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic.

²⁵ Noorhaidi Hasan, ed., *Ulama Dan Negara Bangsa: Membaca Masa Depan Islam Politik Di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pusat Pengkajian Islam Demokrasi dan Perdamaian (PusPIDeP, 2019), 7.

²⁶ Jinan, "New Media Dan Pergeseran Otoritas Keagamaan Islam Di Indonesia," 184.

²⁷ Rumadi, "Islam Dan Otoritas Keagamaan."

²⁸ Rumadi, 28–29.

²⁹ Rumadi, 41.

³⁰ Arrobi and Nadzifah, "Otoritas Agama Di Era Korona: Dari Fragmentasi Ke Konvergensi?," June 2020.

Arrobi and Nadzifah's research is also supported by a study conducted by Masdar Hilmy and Khairon Ni'am in their study, *Winning the Battle of Authorities: The Muslim Disputes Over the Covid-19 Pandemic Plague in Contemporary Indonesia*.³¹ The article reveals that what underscores the Muslim response to the plague seems to be a battle over authority between inductive scientific reasoning as represented by science on the one hand and deductive textual reasoning as represented by religionists such as ulama, on the other. In the long run, in the way they lead Muslims in understanding the current pandemic, religious believers seem to need to take the benefits of scientific inductive reasoning into religious reasoning in order to match science. Despite the resistance to the pandemic, eventually the government and its policies decided to try to prevent the spread of the pandemic by adopting standard medical protocols such as social and *physical distancing*, *stay-at-home* policies, and the like. At this time, neither individuals nor institutions have shown their resistance to government policies in dealing with the outbreak. Therefore, this article predicts that *inductivized religion* seems to be a realistic solution in compromising the endless battle between the two ways of reasoning in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic.³²

In line with that, Wa Ode Zainab Zilullah Toresano in her study, *Integration of Science and Religion: Breaking Down Arrogance in the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic*,³³ (also sees that many religious figures in Indonesia are counterproductive by holding the opinion that everything that happens in this life is God's destiny. Therefore, in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, according to him, he is more fatalistic. This attitude was found in the Jamaah Tabligh group that organized the Asian zone World Ijtima' in Gowa, South Sulawesi in mid-March 2020 with 8,695 participants from various countries. Their theological argument is usually "we only fear Allah, we do not fear other than Him. This is what is called the Jabariyah theological view. This religious attitude can be referred to as a reactive and counter-productive attitude of religion that has the potential to contribute to spreading the Covid-19 pandemic through religious behaviors manifested in communal religious rituals.³⁴

Fatalistic religious groups and religious conservatism tend to oppose the truth of science and health authorities and this is not only the case in Indonesia, but also in other parts of the world. In the United States, there are cases of religious conservatism groups, namely nationalist-agamist Republicans and American nationalist Christians having an attitude of downplaying the

³¹ Hilmy and Niam, "Winning the Battle of Authorities."

³² Hilmy and Niam, 320.

³³ Wa Ode Zainab Zilullah Toresan, "Integrasi Sains Dan Agama: Meruntuhkan Arogansi Di Masa Pandemi Covid-19," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 231–45.

³⁴ Toresan, 233.

truth of science in the face of Covid-19, where a Virginia pastor continues to open public worship in the church and always preaches against the truth of science. In another case, a pastor at the Tampa Bay, Florida Church in preaching always encourages his congregation to shake hands with each other, and those who do not want to be accused of being 'sissies'.³⁵ As for Lee Man-hee, the head of the religious sect of the Shincheonji Jesus Church in South Korea, who claims to be the Messiah, had an attitude against Covid-19, but finally apologized because 60 percent of his congregation was the source of the Covid-19 pandemic in South Korea. The religious conservatism group in Malaysia, Jamaah Tabligh, held Ijtima activities on February 28-March 1, 2020 with 16,000 participants at the Sri Petaling Mosque, Malaysia, and the results became the center of the Covid-19 pandemic in the country.

However, what is interesting in Arrobi and Nadzifah's study is that there is a shift in the reception of religious circles in responding to the Covid-19 issue in Indonesia. According to Arrobi and Nadzifah, in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia, religious authorities, especially Islam, have not only experienced fragmentation but also pluralization and convergence. It is evident in their study that reactive-productive groups also eventually helped mitigate the Covid-19 pandemic. This is where religion as a positive force is able to play a role in building a constructive positive attitude towards the Covid-19 pandemic for their followers through socialization and education for the prevention of the outbreak of this virus in the midst of religious people.³⁶ Finally, this research also provides a new perspective for previous research on new religious authorities as conducted by Muzakki;³⁷ Iqbal;³⁸ Burhani;³⁹ Akmaliah;⁴⁰ Arifianto.⁴¹

In the realm of Christianity, scientists have also conducted studies related to the response of Christians or the Church to the Covid-19 pandemic.⁴² However, this study is more likely to

³⁵ Musa Maliki, "Covid-19, Agama, Dan Sains," *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 65.

³⁶ Arrobi and Nadzifah, "Otoritas Agama Di Era Korona: Dari Fragmentasi Ke Konvergensi?," June 2020, 211.

³⁷ Akh Muzakki, "Islamic Televangelism in Changing Indonesia: Transmission, Authority, and the Politics of Ideas," in *Global and Local Televangelism*, ed. Pradip Ninan Thomas and Philip Lee (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012), 45–63, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137264817_3.

³⁸ Asep M. Iqbal, "Internet, Identity and Islamic Movements: The Case of Salafism in Indonesia," *Islamika Indonesiana* 1, no. 1 (June 7, 2014): 81–105, <https://doi.org/10.15575/isin.v1i1.42>.

³⁹ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme Dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan," *Maarif* 11, no. 2 (2016): 15–29; Burhani, "Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia."

⁴⁰ Wahyudi Akmaliah, *Politik Sirkulasi Budaya Pop: Media Baru, Pelintiran Agama, Dan Pergeseran Otoritas* (Yogyakarta: Mojok, 2019).

⁴¹ Alexander R. Arifianto, "Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia," *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (May 2020): 37–50, <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.10>.

⁴² Ben Simon, "Religion in Conservative Mideast Adapts to Coronavirus," *The Jakarta Post*, March 24, 2020, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/03/24/religion-in-conservative-mideast-adapts-to-coronavirus.html>; Immanuela P. Saputro, "Analisis Kesiapan Gereja Kristen Protestan Melakukan Ibadah

show how Christians are more solid between the church and its people in facing the Covid-19 pandemic.

Research Methods

The sociological approach used in this research wants to capture the dynamics of religious people in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic in South Kalimantan. As a *field research*, researchers tried to obtain information related to the "response of religious authorities", both from Muslim and Christian circles, in South Kalimantan through data collection instruments, namely interviews, observation and documentation.

This research is descriptive-qualitative, by exploring in depth the views of various Islamic and Christian religious leaders in South Kalimantan in seeing, feeling, interpreting the conditions and impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The research subjects were Islamic and Christian religious leaders in the South Kalimantan region, namely Banjarmasin City, Martapura (Banjar Regency), Barabai (Hulu Sungai Tengah) and Amuntai (Hulu Sungai Utara). The subjects were selected using a *snowball sampling* approach based on their religious prominence in the community and their religious organizations and their willingness to consciously explore and articulate their experiences.

Through the various processes above, the data analysis steps of this research can be divided into three lines of research activities that can be carried out simultaneously, namely: data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing or verification.

Results and Discussion

Daring Selama Pandemi Covid19 Menggunakan Metode Inferensi Tsukamoto," *Jurnal Ilmiah Realtech* 16, no. 2 (November 6, 2020): 67–72, <https://doi.org/10.52159/realtech.v16i2.136>; Suharyadi Suharyadi et al., "Digitalisasi Gereja Kristen Jawa Salatiga Timur: Solusi Pelayanan Jemaat Di Tengah Pandemi Covid-19," *SELAPARANG Jurnal Pengabdian Masyarakat Berkemajuan* 4, no. 2 (April 5, 2021): 243–49, <https://doi.org/10.31764/jpmb.v4i2.4046>; Daniel Fajar Panuntun and Eunike Paramita, "Hospitalitas Kristen Dan Tantangannya Di Tengah Pandemi Covid-19," *HARMONI: Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius* 19, no. 1 (June 2020): 67–84; Fransiskus Irwan Widjaja et al., "Menuju Evolusi Ibadah Kristen Di Masa Pandemi Covid-19," *Jurnal Teologi Berita Hidup* 3, no. 2 (2021), e-journal.sttberitahidup.ac.id/index.php/jbh; Kinurung Maleh, Sudianto, and Yusak Kurniawan, "Kepemimpinan Majelis Resort Gereja Kalimantan Evangelis (GKE) Di Kalimantan Selatan Masa Pandemi Covid-19," *Jurnal Teologi Pabelum* 1, no. 1 (August 31, 2021): 110–32; Keloso S. Ugak et al., "Persepsi Jemaat Terhadap Ibadah Minggu Live Streaming Gereja Kalimantan Evangelis (GKE) Eppata Banjarmasin," *Jurnal Teologi Pabelum* 1, no. 1 (August 31, 2020): 21–42.

Plague in Banjarese History

The Covid-19 pandemic that is sweeping the world today is a *flashback* to the spread of various epidemics, such as cholera, plague, and Spanish flu that occurred several centuries ago. History records that in 1720 there was a measles pandemic, cholera in 1818, and Spanish flu in 1920. In the second decade of the 19th century, Cholera was first discovered in Saudi Arabia and had an outbreak in Indonesia due to contact with Indonesian pilgrims in the holy land who traveled by ship.⁴³ It is estimated that cholera killed 125,000 people in Java.⁴⁴

In the early decades of the 20th century, the world experienced the Spanish Flu pandemic, which caused the deaths of 50 to 100 million humans worldwide⁴⁵ including Indonesia. The spread of the Spanish flu epidemic is suspected to be through activities caused by World War I.⁴⁶ These activities include the mobilization of American soldiers to Europe.⁴⁷ The return of African labor corps from Europe, Chinese labor corps, and Indian troops under the banner of the British Empire led to pandemics in various countries outside Europe.⁴⁸ It even entered Japan, Korea and Taiwan, which were also at war at the time.⁴⁹

In the Dutch East Indies, colonialism followed by increased mobility of people, both for military and trade purposes, catalyzed the spread of the Spanish flu pandemic to many rural and remote areas.⁵⁰ The outbreak was first known to spread to Java and Kalimantan in late July 1918

⁴³ Eric Tagliacozzo, "Pilgrim Ships and the Frontiers of Contagion: Quarantine Regimes from Southeast Asia to the Red Sea," in *Histories of Health in Southeast Asia Perspectives on the Long Twentieth Century* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014), 48, 51.

⁴⁴ J.J. Rizal, "Wabah, Naga Siluman, Dan Maaf Belanda: Kolom Sejarahwan J.J. Rizal Tentang Makna Di Balik Penyerahan Kembali Keris Diponegoro Oleh Belanda," April 11, 2020, <https://majalah.tempo.co/read/selangan/160155/kolom-jj-rizal-jokowi-belanda-dan-keris-diponegoro>.

⁴⁵ John M. Barry, "How the Horrific 1918 Flu Spread Across America," *Smithsonian Magazine*, November 2017, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/journal-plague-year-180965222/>.

⁴⁶ Jaime Breitnauer, *The Spanish Flu Epidemic and Its Influence on History* (Yorkshire-Philadelphia: Pen and Sword history, 2019), 15.

⁴⁷ Max Roser, "The Spanish Flu (1918-20): The Global Impact of the Largest Influenza Pandemic in History," *Our World in Data*, March 4, 2020, <https://ourworldindata.org/spanish-flu-largest-influenza-pandemic-in-history>.

⁴⁸ Breitnauer, *The Spanish Flu Epidemic and Its Influence on History*, 71–71, 81, 98.

⁴⁹ Robert Farley, "Remembering the 'Spanish Flu' in Asia | The Japan Times," *The Japan Times*, March 29, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/29/commentary/world-commentary/remembering-spanish-flu-asia/#.XrDf5agzbIV>.

⁵⁰ Kirsty Walker, "The Influenza Pandemic of 1918 in Southeast Asia," in *Histories of Health in Southeast Asia Perspectives on the Long Twentieth Century*, Harper Team and Sunil S. Amrith (ed) (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014), 62.

through the Port of Pankattan in North Sumatra.⁵¹ It is suspected that it was brought by contract laborers from Singapore who would work in colonial plantation areas in Sumatra.⁵²

In the context of Banjar society, there have been several outbreaks of various epidemics, such as cholera, bubonic plague and Spanish flu. These epidemics greatly affected the situation in the Banjar War of 1862. The killing of Prince Antasari, for example, is attributed to the smallpox epidemic and dysentery.⁵³ In addition to smallpox, the Upper Barito region in the mid-19th century was also plagued by dysentery.

The spread of Spanish flu in the Dutch East Indies occurred in two waves. *First*, July 1918-September 1918. The virus had spread in June 1918 in Pangkatan (North Sumatra). It is strongly suspected that the plague was transmitted by passengers from Singapore. In this first wave, Kalimantan and Sulawesi were still free from Spanish flu. *Second*, October 1918-January 1919, where Banjarmasin became the first location in the second wave of spread in 1918 that started this flu epidemic case. The flu, which the Banjar people called 'strange disease', 'secret disease', and 'Spanje's cold', became a pandemic that infected 1,424 people in Banjarmasin.

According to the beliefs of the Banjar people in the past, the outbreak of the disease was caused by a ghost. Therefore, the ghost needs to be driven out of the village so that it does not bring disaster to the community. One of the ways to get rid of it is by *Ma'arak Kitab* Bukhari Muslim at night. Usually before the *Ma'arak Kitab* ceremony, *hajat* prayers are held in congregation and the recitation of surah Yasin by placing bottles of water in front of each congregation. *Ma'arak Kitab* is carried out by traveling around the village accompanied by the recitation of poems containing requests to God to be kept away from danger and disease. This activity is closed by sprinkling (*menciciri*) water that has been read surah Yasin earlier around each house with the aim of making a spiritual fence to avoid the plague.⁵⁴

The above beliefs are still adhered to by the Banjar community until now. This can be seen from the religious response of Banjar scholars to the spread of the Covid-19 outbreak in South Kalimantan as reported by Serambi Ummah newspaper throughout March 2020 which contains an appeal to multiply reading the Qur'an, dhikr, and reading Burdah.

⁵¹ Walker, 64.

⁵² Ravando, "Belajar Menangani Wabah Global Dari Pandemi Flu Spanyol 1918," March 21, 2020, <https://bebas.kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/03/21/belajar-dari-pandemi-flu-spanyol-1918>.

⁵³ M. C. Ricklefs, *Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2004*, Terjemahan Satrio Wahono, dkk. (Jakarta: PT. Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2005).

⁵⁴ M. Suriansyah Ideham et al., *Urang Banjar dan kebudayaannya* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2015), 99–100.

Dynamics of Covid-19 Pandemic in South Kalimantan (2020-2021)

The soaring Covid-19 outbreak has made the Indonesian government experience uncertainty in dealing with it. Presidential Decree No. 11 of 2020 concerning the Determination of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid- 19) Public Health Emergency was issued, followed by Government Regulation No. 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating the Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) (<https://katadata.co.id> 2020; <https://news.detik.com> 2020b). After that, on April 3, 2020 the government issued Regulation of the Minister of Health (Permenkes) RI Number 9 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating the Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (<https://www.kemkes.go.id> 2020; <https://covid19.go.id> 2020b; 2020a). In implementing this PSBB, the Special Capital Region of Jakarta became the first province to implement it with a proposal approved on April 6, 2020 and implemented four days later. With the approval of the implementation of PSBB in Jakarta, several regions also submitted proposals for implementing PSBB in their respective regions, including South Kalimantan.

Unfortunately, the policy of implementing PSBB from the central government has been colored by the ambiguous and controversial attitude of the central government itself, so that PSBB, which was originally expected to be an effective means of restraining the spread of Covid-19 in Indonesia, is not optimal. The controversy starts from the central government's slow issuance of PP. No. 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating the Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) which was only published on March 31, 2020. Even though several regions have carried out a total *lockdown* policy for their regions, Tegal, Papua, and Bali (<https://ombudsman.go.id:443> 2020). There is also a tug of interest between Ministries in responding to the implementation of PSBB in Jakarta, such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transportation, DKI Jakarta Government and the Ministry of Industry.

According to Azyumardi Azra, in the Political Analysis Column of Kompas Newspaper (14/05/2020), "From all episodes of the alarming drama, it appears that the central government and its apparatus are not ready to face the worst events in the life of this republic. The Covid-19 pandemic has caused leadership and governance stuttering."⁵⁵

These various things also color the handling of Covid-19 at the regional level. From the data on the spread of positive cases of Covid-19 in Indonesia, one of the provinces that ranks fifth

⁵⁵ Azyumardi Azra, "Pandemi Dan Etika Politik," [kompas.id](https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/05/14/pandemi-dan-etika-politik/), May 14, 2020, <https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/05/14/pandemi-dan-etika-politik/>.

highest nationally with confirmed positive cases of Covid 19 in Indonesia is South Kalimantan. The local government announced its first positive case on March 22, 2020 (<https://news.detik.com> 2020a). The one patient who tested positive for coronavirus was a patient with the code Ulin 01 who was treated at RSUD Ulin Banjarmasin. Patient Ulin 01, now called KS Covid #01, has a history of traveling outside the region, namely to the island of Java. The area the patient visited has been declared infected with the corona virus. From history, patient KS Covid #01 entered the Insan Sanctuary Hospital, Banjarmasin, Saturday (3/14/2020). A few days of being treated at the hospital, the patient was then referred to Banjarmasin Ulin Hospital and entered the special Covid-19 isolation room (<https://www.kanalkalimantan.com> 2020b).

As of three weeks since the first case was announced by the Covid-19 Prevention, Control, and Handling (P3) Task Force Team on March 22, 2020, as of April 12, 2020, the number of patients confirmed positive for Covid-19 has reached 29 people. With a note, 23 people are still being treated in a number of referral hospitals in South Kalimantan, 2 people were declared cured, and 4 people died. Some of the positive patients have a history of being participants in the 2020 World Ulama Ijtima' held in Gowa, South Sulawesi (<https://www.kanalkalimantan.com> 2020b).

A few days later there was a significant spike, where as of April 17, 2020 there were 76 confirmed positive cases. Of these, 61 cases were under treatment, 8 cases recovered and 7 cases died. Confirmed positive cases of Covid-19 undergoing treatment at Ulin Banjarmasin Hospital were 16 cases, Moch. Ansari Saleh Banjarmasin Hospital was 4 cases, Abdul Aziz Marabahan Hospital was 2 cases, H. Boejasin Pelaihari Hospital was 3 cases, Idaman Banjarbaru Hospital was 2 cases, Damanhuri Barabai Hospital was 3 cases, Hasan Basry Kandangan Hospital was 3 cases, Badaruddin Tabalong Hospital was 2 cases, and independent isolation was 26 cases. As a result of this surge in the number of positive cases, South Kalimantan is in the top 10 most Covid-19 cases nationally (<https://www.kanalkalimantan.com> 2020a).

With this development, Banjarmasin City then became the epicenter of the Covid-19 pandemic to several areas in South Kalimantan. With such conditions, there is no choice for Banjarmasin but to implement Large-Scale Social Restrictions in order to limit the mobility of people between regions. The first Large-Scale Social Restriction (PSBB) was implemented in Banjarmasin City based on the Minister of Health Decree Number HK.01.07/Menkes/262/2020 which began to be implemented by the local government on April 24, 2020 (<https://www.antaraneews.com> 2020). In following up on the Minister of Health's decree, the Mayor of Banjarmasin issued Banjarmasin Mayor Regulation No. 33/2020 concerning Guidelines

for the Implementation of Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating the Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) in Banjarmasin City.

In implementing the PSBB, the Banjarmasin City government imposes a curfew from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. local time. Meanwhile, to streamline the implementation of the PSBB itself, the government through the local police established 10 guard posts at each entrance to the city border with the aim of monitoring or checking every person or vehicle entering the city. The 10 posts are guarded by TNI-Polri personnel, Satpol PP, the Transportation Office and the Health Office as well as other agencies involved in handling Covid-19. The main post is located at Banjarmasin City Hall, while other posts such as in East Banjarmasin there are two posts located at Km 6 Main Terminal and Sungai Lulut Post near the market. Then, there are three posts in North Banjarmasin located at Handil Bakti Post, Tangi Wood Roundabout Post and Quarantine House Post. Meanwhile, there is only one post in the West Banjarmasin area or KPL Police Station located in the Trisakti Harbor area of Banjarmasin. Furthermore, two posts were established in the South Banjarmasin area, namely the South Ring post and the Kertak Hanyar post adjacent to the local police station. Two posts were established in the city in the Central Banjarmasin area, located near KFC and next to Duta Mall (<https://www.antaranews.com> 2020).

Because it is considered less effective in reducing the number of Covid-19 cases, the Banjarmasin City government extended the PSBB in this city twice, namely from May 7 to May 21, 2020 and extended again for ten days until May 31, 2020 (<https://koranbanjar.net> 2020a). Besides Banjarmasin, three other regions in South Kalimantan also implemented the PSBB from May 16 to May 30, 2020, namely Banjarbaru city, Banjar district and Barito Kuala district based on the Minister of Health Decree Number HK.01.07/MENKES/304/2020 (<https://mediaindonesia.com> 2020a). Thus, the four cities and districts simultaneously implemented the PSBB. With this simultaneous PSBB, restrictions on the mobility of people between adjacent areas can be coordinated. The hope is of course that the graph of positive Covid-19 case rates in their respective regions can decrease.

However, what is interesting about the implementation of PSBB in Banjarmasin and in other areas in South Kalimantan is that various efforts to curb the spread of Covid-19 in South Kalimantan are not directly proportional to the increasing trend of Covid-19 cases in this area. The total number of confirmed positive cases of Covid-19 in South Kalimantan as of May 28, 2020 has reached 819 patients with a total of 72 deaths. The region that contributed the most positive patients was Banjarmasin with 112 cases. (<https://regional.kompas.com> 2020b). Therefore, South Kalimantan ranks fifth highest in Covid-19 cases nationally.

This ironic fact, according to several media sources, is due to the low or undisciplined South Kalimantan residents in complying with health protocols during the PSBB implementation period. (<http://jejakbanua.com> 2020). There was even an expression, "the Banjar people are *"mucil"* (unruly)" and "OKP" (*orang Kada Pama'asian*).⁵⁶ Both terms describe the social behavior of a group of people who do not want to obey and be disciplined and indifferent to the implementation of the government's Covid-19 health protocol in this area. In addition, the implementation of PSBB in several areas of South Kalimantan also seems to be carried out merely ceremonially. This is because during the implementation of PSBB in several areas of South Kalimantan, community activities in public places, such as traditional markets, remained normal as before (<https://republika.co.id> 2020c).

In the midst of the situation of the high level of Covid-19 exposure in the community during the implementation of PSBB, the Central Government has actually discussed the implementation of *New Normal*. With the above policy, shopping centers, restaurants, and restaurants that were closed during PSBB and implemented a *take away* system are gradually opened.

In the context of implementing this *New Normal* policy at the regional level, the Governor of South Kalimantan Province, H. Sahbirin Noor prepared Governor Regulation No. 66 in June 2020 on the New Living Order which contains guidelines for regional communities to return to being productive and safe from COVID-19 (<https://mediaindonesia.com> 2020c). However, although the city of Banjarmasin has ended the implementation of PSBB on May 31, 2020, the mayor of Banjarmasin, Ibnu Sina, instead of implementing the *New Normal* policy, chose to intensify PSBK (Complex, Village, or Village-Scale Social Restrictions). This policy aims to further educate city residents about the importance of adhering to health protocols, as well as suppressing the spread of COVID-19. In the context of these small-scale restrictions, the Banjarmasin city government also initiated the realization of "Kampung Tangguh". The establishment of Kampung Tangguh Banua was initiated by residents to counteract the spread of the Covid-19 virus, so that there are areas that can become green zones. The two Banua Resilient Villages inaugurated by the city government are in North Belitung Village and Basirih Village, West Banjarmasin District (<https://kalsel.antaranews.com> 2020).

⁵⁶ Mujiburrahman, "Polisinya Adalah Kita Sendiri."

To support his policy, Mayor Ibnu Sina issued a circular letter on the Emergency Response Status after the PSBB. According to Ibnu Sina, the Emergency Response Status after PSBB applies the same rules regarding health protocols. Health protocols such as *physical distancing* are still implemented. It's just that there is no longer a curfew rule, the post at the border also no longer exists like during the PSBB. On the other hand, economic activities and community businesses such as markets, malls, MSMEs and houses of worship are reopened, but with restrictions or provisions on health protocols. Furthermore, Ibnu Sina said that his party will gradually implement the *new normal* policy in accordance with the direction of the central government (<https://mediaindonesia.com> 2020b).

The attitude of the Banjarmasin City Government, which canceled the implementation of the *new normal* policy and set the emergency response status after the PSBB, was due to the fact that as of May 29, positive cases in South Kalimantan had reached 893 cases, the largest of which were contributed by Banjarmasin 404 cases, Banjar Regency 15 cases, Banjarbaru 10 cases, and Tanah Laut 8 cases. At the end of the implementation of the PSBB, as of May 31, the number of positive cases of Covid-19 rose again to 918 cases, which among others came from Banjarmasin 419 cases, Banjar district 110 cases, Banjarbaru 45 cases, Tanah Laut 63 cases, and Barito Kuala 81, and Tanah Bumbu 124.

Meanwhile, after the termination of the implementation of the PSBB, there was another spike in positive Covid-19 cases in South Kaliman as of June 5, totaling 1,213 cases, which among others came from Banjarmasin 629 cases, Banjar district 118 cases, Banjarbaru 64 cases, Tanah Laut 83 cases, and Barito Kuala 87, and Tanah Bumbu 134. A few days later, there was another spike in positive Covid-19 cases in South Kalimantan as of June 8, totaling 1,347, which among others came from Banjarmasin 693 cases, Banjar district 140 cases, Banjarbaru 68 cases, Tanah Laut 90 cases, and Barito Kuala 100, and Tanah Bumbu 137 (<https://mediaindonesia.com> 2020b).

As experts feared, the termination of PSBB and the discourse of the implementation of the *New Normal* in South Kalimantan had serious consequences, where Covid-19, which was originally only concentrated in Banjarmasin, finally spread massively outside the city, starting from the closest point of the epicenter, Banjarbaru city, Banjar and Barito Kuala regencies. From these two districts, it then spreads to other districts until it is evenly distributed throughout the region

in South Kalimantan.⁵⁷ According to Sri Astuti's study,⁵⁸ data as of July 12, 2020, South Kalimantan residents who were positively exposed to Covid-19 were 4,146 people, 216 people died, and 1,395 people have been declared cured and 2,535 people are in treatment. Throughout July 2020, four urban villages in Banjarmasin city were designated as Covid-19 'black zones', namely Pekapuran Raya Urban Village in East Banjarmasin Subdistrict, Pemurus Dalam and Pemurus Baru Urban Villages in South Banjarmasin Subdistrict, and Teluk Dalam Urban Village in Central Banjarmasin Subdistrict.⁵⁹ The four villages are Teluk Dalam (Central Banjarmasin), Pemurus Baru and Pemurus (South Banjarmasin), and Pekapuran Raya (East Banjarmasin). The details are Teluk Dalam, which is positive for 65 people, 1 person recovered and 10 people died. Pemurus had 77 positive people, 8 people recovered and 7 people died. Pemurus Baru 64 people were positive, 5 people recovered and 7 people died. Meanwhile, in Pekapuran Raya, 104 people were positive, 21 people recovered and 7 people died. As a result, South Kalimantan was ranked sixth as the province with the largest number of positive cases of covid-19 infection in Indonesia with 6,989 cases.⁶⁰

One of the regional officials who fell victim to the ferocity of Covid-19 was the Mayor of Banjarbaru, Nadjmi Adhani, who tested positive on July 25, 2020 and died on August 10, 2020. In addition, there are also several regional officials who have been exposed to Covid-19, but can recover after receiving treatment at the hospital. In addition, there is also one religious figure who became a victim of Covid-19 in South Kalimantan, Tuan Guru KH. Muhammad Ridwan Baseri or better known as Guru Kapuh died at the age of 55 on Wednesday, August 11, 2021 morning at 09.05 at Brigadier General H. Hasan Basry Hospital, Kandangan, Hulu Sungai Selatan Regency after 13 days of treatment. He is the caregiver of Majelis Taklim al-Hidayah, caregiver of Ibnu Aththaillah Islamic Boarding School and Chairman of the MUI of Hulu Sungai Selatan Regency. During the Covid-19 period in South Kalimantan, he was a charismatic cleric who was very

⁵⁷ Hidayatullah Muttaqin, "Infografis Kesembuhan dan Kematian Covid-19 Kalimantan Selatan 31 Desember 2020," *Tim Pakar ULM* (blog), December 31, 2020, <https://covid19.ulm.ac.id/infografis-kesembuhan-dan-kematian-covid-19-kalimantan-selatan-31-desember-2020/>.

⁵⁸ Sri Astuty, "Mengkritisi Komunikasi Publik 'New Normal' Di Kalimantan Selatan," in *Lara Pandemi Covid-19: Perdebatan Penanggulangan, Kebijakan Dan Implikasi Sosial*, Desmond J Mahesa, Dwiyanto Indiahono, dan Taufik Arbain (Banjarmasin: IAPA, PSKP ULM dan Pustaka Banua, 2021), 140–41.

⁵⁹ Andy Arfian, "Empat Wilayah Masuk 'Zona Hitam' Covid-19, Pemko Banjarmasin Belum Ambil Langkah Ekstra," July 10, 2020, <https://kanalkalimantan.com/empat-wilayah-masuk-zona-hitam-covid-19-pemko-banjarmasin-belum-ambil-langkah-ekstra/>.

⁶⁰ Rima Hariati and Muhammad Abdan Shadiqi, "Perilaku Kepatuhan Masyarakat Kalimantan Selatan Pada Masa Adaptasi Kebiasaan Baru," *Tim Pakar ULM* (blog), August 14, 2020, <https://covid19.ulm.ac.id/perilaku-kepatuhan-masyarakat-kalimantan-selatan-pada-masa-adaptasi-kebiasaan-baru/>.

proactive in socializing the importance of human efforts in avoiding the outbreak of a developing disease and the obligation to carry out Health protocols in his lectures.

Religious Authority Response

Sociologically, the Banjar community structure in South Kalimantan has a patron-client relationship between religious leaders and the community. Religious figures in Banjar society represent the center of authority that derives from religious beliefs and have absolute authority in interpreting religious sources. Thus, the relationship between religious figures and the community is formed on the basis of obedience.⁶¹

The Banjar community is known to be religious, so the pattern of relationships between religious leaders and the community is also based on strong religious emotions. The charismatic power of religious figures binds the community more strongly. Similarly, the role of religious figures, who are regarded as a source of solving their religious problems, further strengthens the pattern of these relationships.⁶² Religious figures are able to provide major changes to the social conditions of the community. They are able to shift people's actions towards the actions they want. The factor that causes the success of the changes desired by religious leaders in addition to being caused by compliance is the ability of religious leaders to explain complicated issues for the community to be easier. This communication ability is an added value for religious leaders to influence people's awareness in order to do what they are told to do.⁶³

In the context of the Corona outbreak that has hit the world, and including all regions in Indonesia, of course religious people are encouraged to understand and interpret this crisis from the point of view of religious teachings as values that are referred to and become a framework for seeing reality and the basis for their actions. The sources of religious teachings are explored and interpreted in accordance with the demands being faced. In reality, in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, religious authorities are not single, even experiencing fragmentation and pluralization. On the one hand, religious authorities, through their institutions and religious leaders, can play a positive-constructive role towards the Covid-19 pandemic in the form of religious narratives and practices that are accommodating to the Covid-19 health protocol recommendations from government authorities. However, on the other hand, religious authorities can also play a negative-

⁶¹ Yahya Muhaimin, "Persoalan Budaya Politik Di Indonesia," in *Profil Budaya Politik Indonesia*, Alfian dan Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1991), 51–62.

⁶² Endang Turmudi, *Perselingkuhan Kiai Dan Kekuasaan* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), 97.

⁶³ Sayfa Auliya Achidsti, *Kiai Dan Pembangunan Institusi Sosial* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2015), 54.

contraproductive role towards the Covid-19 pandemic in the form of religious narratives and practices that are counterproductive to the Covid-19 health protocol recommendations from government authorities.

In the context of the religious sector, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has issued several Ministerial Circulars. In the early days of the pandemic, policies in the religious sector followed Permenkes No. 9 of 2020, which regulates "religious activities carried out at home". Meanwhile, when facing the month of Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr, the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued Minister of Religious Affairs Circular Letter No. 6 of 2020 concerning Guidance for Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr 1 Shawwal 1441 H amid the Covid-19 Pandemic on April 6, 2020.

Thus, directly the policy of handling the Covid-19 pandemic implemented by the government has brought religious life to a new phase. At the beginning of the Pandemic, places of worship had to be closed, or creatively organized with a home worship model. Church buildings are closed and only serve congregations with online worship services (*live streaming*), mosques eliminate congregational prayers, even in Ramadan 1441 H mosques and mushalas eliminate Tarawih prayers and break the fast together. Likewise, monasteries, temples and shrines are also closed.

The response of Islamic organizations to the policy was manifested in the form of circulars, instructions, and appeals. MUI issued several fatwas, namely Fatwa Number 14 of 2020 concerning the Implementation of Worship in the Situation of a Covid-19 Outbreak (<https://mui.or.id> 2020g). MUI Fatwa Number 17 of 2020 on 'Guidelines for Kaifiat Shalat for Health Workers Wearing PPE when Caring for and Handling Covid-19 Patients' (2020a, 17). (<https://mui.or.id> 2020a, 17) MUI Fatwa Number 18 of 2020 on 'Guidelines for the Management of the Bodies (Tajhiz Al-Jana'iz) of Muslims Infected with Covid-19' (<https://mui.or.id> 2020b), MUI Fatwa Number: 23 of 2020 on the Utilization of Zakat, Infaq, and Shadaqah Assets to Counter the Covid-19 Outbreak and its Impacts (<https://mui.or.id> 2020f), MUI Fatwa Number 31 of 2020 on the Organization of Friday Prayers and Congregations to Prevent the Transmission of Covid-19 (<https://mui.or.id> 2020c), MUI Fatwa No. 28 of 2020 Regarding Guidance on the Kaifiat Takbir and Eid Al-Fitr Prayers During Covid 19 (<https://mui.or.id> 2020d), MUI Fatwa No. 36 Regarding Eid al-Adha Prayers and Slaughtering of Sacrificial Animals During the Covid-19 Outbreak (<https://mui.or.id> 2020e).

Long before the government officially announced the Covid-19 outbreak, the Executive Board of Nahdhatul Ulama (PBNU) had issued instruction letter Number 3905/C.I.34/02/2020

dated February 10 regarding the recitation of Shalawat Thibbil Qulub. Furthermore, as soon as the positive cases of Covid-19 in Indonesia were officially announced, NU immediately issued several instruction letters and circulars, namely Instruction and Advisory letter number 3925/C.I.34/03/2020 dated March 3 regarding reading qunut nazilah and increasing practices and prayers to ward off bad luck and maintain health and cleanliness to avoid Covid-19, PBNU Instruction Letter Number 3945/C.I.34/03/2020 regarding NU Protocols for Caring for Covid-19 dated March 12, 2020 (<https://www.nu.or.id> 2020a), PBNU Circular Letter Number 3952/C.134/03/2020 dated March 25 about complying with instructions, appeals, and protocols from the government in dealing with Covid 19, including not leaving the house, eliminating congregational religious activities outside the home and maintaining a safe distance, PBNU Circular Letter Number 3953/C.I.034/04/2020 dated April 3 about Implementing Taraweeh prayers and Eid prayers at home (<https://www.nu.or.id> 2020b). In addition to issuing circulars, PBNU also issued the results of Bahtsul Masail, namely on the Implementation of Friday prayers in areas infected with Covid 19 dated March 19, 2020, the Results of Bahtsul Masail PBNU Bahtsul Masail Institution on Fiqh of Caring for the Bodies of Covid-19 Patients dated March 21, 2020, and the Results of Bahtsul Masail PBNU on the Implementation of 'Id prayers at Home dated May 20, 2020.

The Muhammadiyah Central Board also issued several decrees, circulars, and edicts, namely the circular of P.P. Muhammadiyah Number 05/Edr/I.0/E/2020 concerning Guidance and Guidelines for Facing the Pandemic and the Impact of Covid-19. (<http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id> 2020) Decree of P.P. Muhammadiyah Number 02/MLM/I.0/H/2020 on the Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19) Outbreak dated March 14, 2020, Decree of P.P. Muhammadiyah Number 2825/KEP/I.0/D/2020 on the Establishment of *Muhammadiyah Covid 19 Command Center* dated March 14, 2020, P.P. Muhammadiyah letter Number 129/I.0/B/2020 on the Establishment of MCCC at the Regional Level dated March 14, 2020, P.P. Muhammadiyah edict Number 03/I.0/B/2020 on the Implementation of Friday and Fardu Prayers in Congregation during the Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19) Outbreak dated March 20, 2020, P.P. Muhammadiyah Decree Number 2894/KEP/I.0 /B/2020 on Changes in the Time of Implementation of Friday and Fardu Prayers during the Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19) Outbreak dated March 20, 2020./B/2020 concerning Changes in the Time of Organizing the 48th Muhammadiyah Congress and the 48th 'Aisyiah Congress dated March 24, 2020, and circular of P.P. Muhammadiyah Number 03/EDR/I.0/E/2020 concerning Demands for Worship in Covid 19 Emergency Conditions containing the fatwa of the Tarjih and Tajdid Assembly dated March 24, 2020.

In addition to issuing circulars as above, MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah also utilize online media and educate the public in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic, such as mui.or.id, NU online, NU Channel, IG [nuonline_id](https://www.instagram.com/nuonline_id), [m.muhammadiyah.or.id](https://www.facebook.com/m.muhammadiyah.or.id), Muhammadiyah Channel, and others.

To complement the work of the people affected by Covid-19, these organizations also established service centers, such as the MUI Covid-19 Task Force, NUcare, and the *Muhammadiyah Covid-19 Command Center* (MCCC). These service centers move nationally to the regions whose task is to educate, socialize and distribute Covid-19 assistance.

As a form of agreement with the government's efforts to contain the rate of Covid-19 cases in Indonesia, NU also postponed the National Conference of Alim Ulama (Munas) and the Great Conference (Konbes) which were originally to be held on March 18-19, 2020 at the al-Anwar Islamic Boarding School, Rembang, Central Java. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah also postponed its 48th Congress which was originally scheduled for July 1-5, 2020 in Solo, Central Java to December 24-27, 2020.

At the South Kalimantan Provincial level, several of the above decrees, circulars, appeals were followed up by each component of the regional organization. The South Kalimantan Ulema Council (MUI) issued an appeal letter No. 11/DP-P/MUI-KS/SR/III/2020 dated March 26, 2020 asking Muslims in this area not to hold Friday prayers and replace them with zuhur prayers in their homes, and not to hold religious activities that involve many people either in mosques or other places. (<https://klikkalsel.com> 2020). A few weeks later, MUI South Kalimantan also issued the second appeal letter with No. 13/DP-P/MUI-KS/SR/IV/2020 on April 6, 2020. In this appeal, MUI South Kalimantan further detailed its appeal, among others: 1) the previous appeal not to hold Friday prayers also applies to mosques in provincial and district / city capitals; 2) shaf is set \pm 1 meter apart and bring their respective prayer mats; wear masks; 3) sermons are shortened by 5-7 minutes. In addition, MUI South Kalimantan together with the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of South Kalimantan and the South Kalimantan Mosque Council issued Appeal Letters Number 16/DP-P/MUI-KS/SR/IV/2020; 781/Kw.17.1-5/H.M.01/4/2020; 002/Pw.DMI-KS/IV/2020 concerning Guidelines for the Implementation of Congregational Prayers, Friday Prayers, Worship in the Holy Month of Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr 1441 H/2020 M in Conditions of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) Pandemic dated April 15, 2020.

On the basis of the appeal letter above, the Banjarmasin Sabital Muhtadin Mosque Manager, as the largest mosque and under the auspices of the South Kalimantan Provincial Government, also issued a notification letter Number: 039/BP-MRSM/III/2020 dated March 26,

2020 regarding the temporary suspension of Friday prayers (<https://klikkalsel.com> 2020). The stance taken by the Sabilal Muhtadin Grand Mosque was also followed by almost all mosques in Banjarmasin City and other districts in the South Kalimantan region.

At the same time, there was also a joint call from ulama throughout South Kalimantan to obey the government's recommendations in implementing health protocols in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. (<https://republika.co.id> 2020b). Some individual ulama figures, such as KH. Husein Nafarin (Chairman of MUI South Kalimantan), KH. Murjani Sani, M. Ag. (Chairman of MUI Banjarmasin City), KH. M. Ridwan Baseri (Guru Kapuh), Guru KH. Ahmad Zuhdiannoor, and Guru KH. Muhammad Bakhiet also joined the call for the public to comply with health protocols by closing their regular recitations. Some of them have replaced face-to-face recitations with online recitations, either via Youtube or other live streaming media (<https://jejakrekam.com> 2020; <https://apahabar.com> 2020b; <https://koranbanjar.net> 2020b).

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is also felt by Catholics in South Kalimantan. The Catholic Church of Banjarmasin Diocese under the leadership of Mgr Petrus Boddeng Timang, through 14 Parishes spread across cities and regencies in South Kalimantan, has always appealed to Catholics in this area to obey government regulations and appeals. This form of obedience is realized by repeatedly closing churches under the auspices of the diocese to avoid crowds and diverting daily and weekly worship mass activities and all worship rituals that involve and bring in many people, both at the parish, neighborhood, and regional levels to their respective homes (<https://kabar24.bisnis.com> 2020).

The closure of this church has been carried out repeatedly since March 21, 2020, as stated in the Decree of the Diocese of Banjarmasin No. 15/USK/B.1.9/III.20. For this reason, the Catholic Church of the Diocese of Banjarmasin creates online worship activity programs to serve its people. The worship activities are broadcast *live streaming* through Youtube channel and local television media. This policy is stated in Decree No. 021/SK/USK/B.1.0/III.2020. This virtual worship model is carried out because until mid-August 2021 the Diocese of Banjarmasin is still closing several churches. This is also stated in the Banjarmasin Diocese Notification Letter No. 21/USK/B..1.9/II.2021. In addition, the Catholic Church of the Diocese of Banjarmasin, through its parishes, also organizes activities that involve other religions. For example, breaking the fast together in the month of Ramadan, raising and distributing aid during disasters, assisting in the distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE) and foodstuffs, holding mass vaccinations (<https://banjarmasin.tribunnews.com> 2021c).

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is also felt by Christians in South Kalimantan. The Association of Indonesian Churches (PGI), through its chairman Gomar Gultom, also issued an appeal to worship at home. The PGI even urged churches to reduce face-to-face worship meetings and suggested preparing alternative worship by utilizing social media and digital technology to develop e-church.⁶⁴

In South Kalimantan, the above appeal was immediately followed up within the Kalimantan Evangelical Church (GKE). In the South Kalimantan region, there are eight resorts under the scope of the Kalimantan Evangelical Church (GKE) consisting of the Banjarmasin, Tanah Laut, Labuhan, Murung Pudak, Tabalong, Loksado, Southeast Kalimantan, and Samihim regional resorts. Four GKE resorts are located in cities: one in the provincial capital and three in district capitals. Four more resorts are located in sub-district towns or villages. Several Resort Chairpersons described how the impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic affected the leadership and ministry systems in their areas.

One of the members of the Kalimantan Evangelical Church (GKE) Eppata Congregation, has received institutional church education on the implementation of worship from home online to break the chain of the spread of Covid-19. The GKE Synod Assembly (MS) issued MS GKE Circular Letter no. 97 of 2020 concerning follow-up to the prevention of Covid-19 transmission dated March 19, 2020, then followed up by the Chairperson of the Daily Worker Agency (BPH) of the Banjarmasin GKE Eppata Congregation Assembly (MJ) Rev. Bessel Jarias, S.Th., M. Si, by issuing a circular letter that congregations worship Sunday at their respective homes in the form of *live streaming*. The *live streaming* Sunday service of the GKE Eppata congregation began on April 5, 2020. The choice of BPH MJ GKE Eppata to carry out *live streaming* Sunday worship followed by the congregation from their respective homes is not an ideal choice, but it is the best choice during the Covid-19 pandemic.⁶⁵

Up to the discussion of the positive-constructive role of religious authorities towards the Covid-19 pandemic above, religious authorities can also play a negative-contraproductive role towards the Covid-19 pandemic in the form of religious narratives and practices that are

⁶⁴ Markus, "Himbauan Majelis Pekerja Harian Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Di Indonesia (MPH-PGI)," *Website PGI* (blog), March 16, 2020, <https://pgi.or.id/himbauan-majelis-pekerja-harian-persekutuan-gereja-gereja-di-indonesia-mpg-pgi/>. A Hafidzi, "Cultural Education As An Effort To Prevent Religious-Based Radicalism On Social Media In Indonesia," *Potret Pemikiran*, no. Query date: 2024-03-12 11:48:55 (2020), <http://journal.iain-manado.ac.id/index.php/PP/article/view/1116>.

⁶⁵ Ugak et al., "Persepsi Jemaat Terhadap Ibadah Minggu Live Streaming Gereja Kalimantan Evangelis (GKE) Eppata Banjarmasin," 23.

counterproductive to the Covid-19 health protocol recommendations from government authorities. These counterproductive religious narratives and practices developed during Covid-19 as a form of fragmentation of religious authority during Covid-19. Especially when we talk about religious authority in the era of today's information society, especially the era of new media, of course the presence of religious authority is no longer singular but even fragmentary and pluralistic in society. Such a situation certainly has an impact on the response of religious authorities that can no longer be full and single. Here, there will be various responses that are present because the religious authority itself has experienced fragmentation and pluralization of authority.⁶⁶

We can trace the fragmentation of religious authority in the Covid-19 period to the initial reaction that emerged among Indonesian religious circles when the first case of the Corona outbreak developed in Wuhan, China. Instead of being concerned about the disaster that occurred in China, some religious circles, especially Muslims in Indonesia, considered the Corona outbreak as a form of "Allah's punishment" to the Chinese people who acted unjustly against Uighur Muslims whose rights they oppressed.

With these narratives, some Muslims tend to ignore various recommendations regarding the Covid-19 health protocol that have been socialized by the government. The implementation of tarawih prayers and Friday prayers in congregation is still widely practiced in several mosques, such as in Aceh (<https://www.bbc.com> 2020), Bogor, Bekasi (<https://www.medcom.id> 2020), Lombok (kompas.com 2020) Parepare, Ciamis, Bangka Belitung, Tegal, Martapura, even in Jambi, who have tested positive for Covid-19, continue to be mosque priests (<https://banjarmasin.tribunnews.com> 2020). Even in Martapura, there was a forced opening of the al-Karomah mosque which was closed by the Banjar district government by the congregation of Friday prayers (<https://banjarmasin.tribunnews.com> 2020). Their considerations are more theological than health, let alone science such as epidemiology and virology. Finally, the Covid-19 crisis also re-reveals the problem of the relationship between religion and science, where the religious reasoning developed in the narratives above is not in line with and even far from the empirical reasoning of science.⁶⁷ In South Kalimantan, such religious disobedience and rituals have proven to be one of the epicenters of the spread of Covid 19.

⁶⁶ Burhani, "Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia"; Iqbal, "Internet, Identity and Islamic Movements."

⁶⁷ A Hafidzi, "The Ability of Islamic Boarding School Students in Facing the Digital Literacy Era with Critical Reading," *IJGIE (International Journal of Graduate of ...)*, no. Query date: 2024-03-12 11:48:55 (2020), <http://journal.iaisambas.ac.id/index.php/IJGIE/article/view/231>; A Hafidzi, "Konsep Toleransi Dan Kematangan Agama Dalam Konflik Beragama Di Masyarakat Indonesia," *Potret Pemikiran*, no. Query date: 2024-03-12 11:48:55 (2019), <http://journal.iain-manado.ac.id/index.php/PP/article/view/1003>.

Factually, we can trace this in the field. When researchers visited one of the well-known Islamic Boarding Schools in the Gambut sub-district of Banjar district, the school had been conducting face-to-face learning. Although in several places in the Pondok environment, banners containing the recommendation of the Covid-19 Health Protocol could be found, neither the students nor the teachers used masks at all. Each class is filled with students whose numbers are no different from the number before the Covid-19 pandemic. Likewise, the learning hours are the same as the learning hours before the Covid-19 pandemic.

According to the Pondok Leader, as long as they carry out face-to-face learning, no students have experienced symptoms of Covid-19. Even if there are those who are sick in the sense of ordinary illness, they are immediately sent home to their parents or we treat them specifically. Although the implementation of this face-to-face learning had received a warning from the government, but for the reason that the Pondok Pesantren is closed, it was finally permitted. As for public recitations, both those held inside the Pondok and outside, which bring in many worshippers, indeed, as recommended by the government, they are temporarily closed.

In line with the Pondok above, traditional Islamic boarding schools around Landasan Ulin also implement face-to-face learning during Covid-19. Even during this learning, the students and teachers did not implement the applicable health protocols at all. Only a few students consciously wear masks. It is not known for certain, whether during Covid 19 anyone was sick or not. The main reason for the boarding school leaders to continue to conduct face-to-face learning is because online learning is unable to accommodate the learning of the yellowclassical books and the cultivation of Islamic values.

While in a boarding school located in Cindai Alus, as told by the Head of the Pondok, during Covid 19, the students were sent home but not long after, based on an agreement with government officials, the students were asked to return to the Pondok considering that online learning did not meet the standards of face-to-face learning. However, learning during Covid 19 strictly adheres to established health protocols. In the researcher's observation, the implementation of health protocols was indeed implemented.

Summary

First, the Covid-19 pandemic that hit South Kalimantan encouraged religious communities to understand and interpret this crisis from the perspective of religious teachings as values that are referred to and become the framework for seeing reality and the basis for their actions. The sources

of religious teachings are explored and interpreted in accordance with the demands being faced. There is a tendency for the response of religious authorities to be positive-constructive in the form of religious narratives and practices that are accommodating to the recommendations of the Covid-19 health protocol from government authorities.

Second, the fragmentation of religious authorities in South Kalimantan during the Covid-19 pandemic tends to be non-single and plural as well as negative-counterproductive to the Covid-19 pandemic which is manifested in the form of narratives and religious practices that are counterproductive to the Covid-19 health protocol recommendations from government authorities.

Bibliography

- Abdullah, M. Amin. "Mendialogkan Nalar Agama Dan Sains Modern Di Tengah Pandemi Covid-19." *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 11–39.
- Abidah, Azmil, Hasan Nuurul Hidayatullaah, Roy Martin Simamora, Daliana Fehabutar, and Lely Mutakinati. "The Impact of Covid-19 to Indonesian Education and Its Relation to the Philosophy of 'Merdeka Belajar.'" *Studies in Philosophy of Science and Education* 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 38–49. <https://doi.org/10.46627/sipose.v1i1.9>.
- Afandi, M., Arif Rofiuddin, Arif Zamhari, Yusuf Rahman, Ade Farida, and Andi Bakti. "The New Ustad in Religious Authority: Challenge and Dynamic of Fatwa in the New Media Era." In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Colloquium on Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies, ICIIIS 2020, 20-21 October 2020, Jakarta, Indonesia*. Jakarta, Indonesia: EAI, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.20-10-2020.2305167>.
- Ahyar, Muzayyin, and Alfitri Alfitri. "Aksi Bela Islam: Islamic Clicktivism and the New Authority of Religious Propaganda in the Millennial Age in Indonesia." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 9, no. 1 (May 24, 2019): 1. <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v9i1.1-29>.
- Akmaliah, Wahyudi. *Politik Sirkulasi Budaya Pop: Media Baru, Pelintiran Agama, Dan Pergeseran Otoritas*. Yogyakarta: Mojok, 2019.
- Alkaf, M. "Agama, Sains, Dan Covid-19: Perspektif Sosial-Agama." *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 93–108.
- Amrullah, M. Kholis. "The South Kalimantan Ulama's Leadership in Covid-19 Pandemic Era." *INNOVATIO: Journal for Religious Innovation Studies* 20, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 111–24. <https://doi.org/10.30631/innovatio.v20i2.111>.
- Andy Arfian. "Empat Wilayah Masuk 'Zona Hitam' Covid-19, Pemko Banjarmasin Belum Ambil Langkah Ekstra," July 10, 2020. <https://kanalkalimantan.com/empat-wilayah-masuk-zona-hitam-covid-19-pemko-banjarmasin-belum-ambil-langkah-ekstra/>.
- Arifianto, Alexander R. "Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia." *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (May 2020): 37–50. <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.10>.
- Arrobi, Mohammad Zaki, and Amsa Nadzifah. "Otoritas Agama Di Era Korona: Dari Fragmentasi Ke Konvergensi?" *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 197–215.
- . "Otoritas Agama Di Era Korona: Dari Fragmentasi Ke Konvergensi?" *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 197–215.
- Astuty, Sri. "Mengkritisi Komunikasi Publik 'New Normal' Di Kalimantan Selatan." In *Lara Pandemi Covid-19: Perdebatan Penanggulangan, Kebijakan Dan Implikasi Sosial*, Desmond J

- Mahesa, Dwiyanto Indiahono, dan Taufik Arbain., 139–53. Banjarmasin: IAPA, PSKP ULM dan Pustaka Banua, 2021.
- Azra, Azyumardi. “Pandemi Dan Etika Politik.” *kompas.id*, May 14, 2020. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/05/14/pandemi-dan-etika-politik/>.
- Azra, Azyumardi, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G. Kaptein, eds. *Varieties of Religious Authority: Changes and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam*. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2010. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/varieties-of-religious-authority/67C3BDCE728013CF5E1294CCD99FAB6F>.
- Barry, John M. “How the Horrific 1918 Flu Spread Across America.” *Smithsonian Magazine*, November 2017. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/journal-plague-year-180965222/>.
- Breitnauer, Jaime. *The Spanish Flu Epidemic and Its Influence on History*. Yorkshire-Philadelphia: Pen and Sword history, 2019.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib. “Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme Dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan.” *Maarif* 11, no. 2 (2016): 15–29.
- . “Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia.” In *Islam in Southeast Asia: Negotiating Modernity*, Norshahril Saat., 140–63. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018.
- Burhanuddin, Jajat, and Ahmad Baedowi. *Transformasi Otoritas Keagamaan: Pengalaman Islam Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama bekerjasama dengan PPIM, UIN Jakarta dan Basic Education Project, Depag, 2003.
- Burhanudin, Jajat. “The Fragmentation of Religious Authority: Islamic Print Media in Early 20th Century Indonesia.” *Studia Islamika* 11, no. 1 (2004): 23–62. <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v11i1.652>.
- Cao, Wenjun, Ziwei Fang, Guoqiang Hou, Mei Han, Xinrong Xu, Jiabin Dong, and Jianzhong Zheng. “The Psychological Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic on College Students in China.” *Psychiatry Research* 287 (May 1, 2020): 112934. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2020.112934>.
- Eickelman, Dale F. and Jon W. Anderson, eds. *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.
- Falahuddin. “Respon Muhammadiyah Menghadapi Covid-19.” *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 137–52.
- Farley, Robert. “Remembering the ‘Spanish Flu’ in Asia | The Japan Times.” *The Japan Times*, March 29, 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/29/commentary/world-commentary/remembering-spanish-flu-asia/#.XrDf5agzbIV>.
- Gaborieau, Marc. “Redefining Religious Authority in South Asian Muslims.” In *Varieties of Religious Authority: Changes and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam*, Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, dan Nico JG Kaptein., 1–16. ISEAS: Singapore, 2010.
- Hafidzi, A. “Cultural Education As An Effort To Prevent Religious-Based Radicalism On Social Media In Indonesia.” *Potret Pemikiran*, no. Query date: 2024-03-12 11:48:55 (2020). <http://journal.iain-manado.ac.id/index.php/PP/article/view/1116>.
- . “Konsep Toleransi Dan Kematangan Agama Dalam Konflik Beragama Di Masyarakat Indonesia.” *Potret Pemikiran*, no. Query date: 2024-03-12 11:48:55 (2019). <http://journal.iain-manado.ac.id/index.php/PP/article/view/1003>.
- . “The Ability of Islamic Boarding School Students in Facing the Digital Literacy Era with Critical Reading.” *IJGIE (International Journal of Graduate of ...)*, no. Query date: 2024-03-12 11:48:55 (2020). <http://journal.iaisambas.ac.id/index.php/IJGIE/article/view/231>.

- Hariati, Rima, and Muhammad Abdan Shadiqi. "Perilaku Kepatuhan Masyarakat Kalimantan Selatan Pada Masa Adaptasi Kebiasaan Baru." *Tim Pakar ULM* (blog), August 14, 2020. <https://covid19.ulm.ac.id/perilaku-kepatuhan-masyarakat-kalimantan-selatan-pada-masa-adaptasi-kebiasaan-baru/>.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi, ed. *Ulama Dan Negara Bangsa: Membaca Masa Depan Islam Politik Di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Pusat Pengkajian Islam Demokrasi dan Perdamaian (PusPIDeP), 2019.
- Hidayah, Nur. "Dari Jabariyah, Ke Qadariyah, Hingga Islam Progresif: Respons Muslim Atas Wabah Corona Di Indonesia." *SALAM: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Syar-i* 7, no. 5 (April 17, 2020): 423–38. <https://doi.org/10.15408/sjsbs.v7i6.15365>.
- Hilmy, Masdar, and Khoirun Niam. "Winning the Battle of Authorities: The Muslim Disputes Over the Covid-19 Pandemic Plague in Contemporary Indonesia." *QIJIS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)* 8, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 293–326. <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v8i2.7670>.
- <http://jejakbanua.com>. "Banyak Warga Tak Disiplin, Haris: Peran Tim KIE Semakin Dimasifkan," Mei 2020. <http://jejakbanua.com/2020/05/23/banyak-warga-tak-disiplin-haris-peran-tim-kie-semakin-dimasifkan/>.
- <https://corona.kalselprov.go.id>. "Covid 19 Kalimantan Selatan: Update," July 8, 2020. <https://corona.kalselprov.go.id/>.
- <https://covid19.who.int>. "WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard," July 18, 2020. <https://covid19.who.int>.
- <https://www.cnnindonesia.com>. "Jokowi Umumkan Dua WNI Positif Corona Di Indonesia," February 3, 2020. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200302111534-20-479660/jokowi-umumkan-dua-wni-positif-corona-di-indonesia>.
- Ibrahim, Azhar. "Being Authoritative But No Authority? Muslim Religious Intellectuals in Shaping Indonesian Islam Discourse." In *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*, Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Najib Burhani (ed.), 28–47. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020.
- Ideham, M. Suriansyah, Syarifuddin, M. Zainal Arifin Anis, and Wajidi. *Urang Banjar dan kebudayaannya*. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2015.
- Indiyanto, Agus, and Arqom Kuswanjono, eds. *Konstruksi Masyarakat Tangguh Bencana*. Bandung-Yogyakarta: Mizan dan Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya (Center for Religious & Cross-cultural Studies) Sekolah Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2012.
- Iqbal, Asep M. "Internet, Identity and Islamic Movements: The Case of Salafism in Indonesia." *Islamika Indonesiana* 1, no. 1 (June 7, 2014): 81–105. <https://doi.org/10.15575/isin.v1i1.42>.
- Jinan, Mutohharun. "Intervensi New Media Dan Impersonalisasi Otoritas Keagamaan Di Indonesia." *Jurnal Komunikasi Islam* 3, no. 2 (December 1, 2013): 321–48. <https://doi.org/10.15642/jki.2013.3.2.%p>.
- . "New Media Dan Pergeseran Otoritas Keagamaan Islam Di Indonesia." *Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan* 10, no. 1 (2012): 181–208.
- Kaptein, Nico. "The Arab Middle East and Religious Authority in Indonesia." *Tebuireng: Journal of Islamic Studies and Society* 1, no. 1 (December 31, 2020): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.33752/tjiss.v1i1.1170>.
- Kuswana, Dadang, Bambang Qomaruzzaman, and Masmuni Mahatma. "Agama Dan Wabah : Tanggapan Ulama Jawa Barat Atas Covid-19 Tahun 2020." *UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung*, 2020. <http://digilib.uinsgd.ac.id/30780/>.
- Maleh, Kinurung, Sudianto, and Yusak Kurniawan. "Kepemimpinan Majelis Resort Gereja Kalimantan Evangelis (GKE) Di Kalimantan Selatan Masa Pandemi Covid-19." *Jurnal Teologi Pabelum* 1, no. 1 (August 31, 2021): 110–32.
- Maliki, Musa. "Covid-19, Agama, Dan Sains." *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 60–92.
- Mandaville, Peter. "Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge: Pluralizing Authority in the Muslim World." *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 101–15.

- Markus. "Himbauan Majelis Pekerja Harian Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Di Indonesia (MPH-PGI)." *Website PGI* (blog), March 16, 2020. <https://pgi.or.id/imbauan-majelis-pekerja-harian-persekutuan-gereja-gereja-di-indonesia-mph-pgi/>.
- Modell, Stephen M., and Sharon L. R. Kardia. "Religion as a Health Promoter During the 2019/2020 COVID Outbreak: View from Detroit." *Journal of Religion and Health*, June 16, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-020-01052-1>.
- Muhaimin, Yahya. "Persoalan Budaya Politik Di Indonesia." In *Profil Budaya Politik Indonesia*, Alfian dan Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin. Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1991.
- Mujiburrahman. "Polisinya Adalah Kita Sendiri." *Banjarmasin Post*, June 8, 2020, sec. Jendela. <https://banjarmasin.tribunnews.com/2020/06/08/polisinya-adalah-kita-sendiri>.
- Muttaqin, Hidayatullah. "Infografis Kesembuhan dan Kematian Covid-19 Kalimantan Selatan 31 Desember 2020." *Tim Pakar ULM* (blog), December 31, 2020. <https://covid19.ulm.ac.id/infografis-kesembuhan-dan-kematian-covid-19-kalimantan-selatan-31-desember-2020/>.
- Muzakki, Akh. "Islamic Televangelism in Changing Indonesia: Transmission, Authority, and the Politics of Ideas." In *Global and Local Televangelism*, edited by Pradip Ninan Thomas and Philip Lee, 45–63. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137264817_3.
- Notonegoro, Abdullah Sidiq. "Sains Melampaui Politik Dan Agama." *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 109–245.
- Panuntun, Daniel Fajar, and Eunike Paramita. "Hospitalitas Kristen Dan Tantangannya Di Tengah Pandemi Covid-19." *HARMONI : Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius* 19, no. 1 (June 2020): 67–84.
- Ravando. "Belajar Menangani Wabah Global Dari Pandemi Flu Spanyol 1918," March 21, 2020. <https://bebas.kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/03/21/belajar-dari-pandemi-flu-spanyol-1918>.
- Ricklefs, M. C. *Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2004*. Terjemahan Satrio Wahono, dkk. Jakarta: PT. Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2005.
- Rizal, J.J. "Wabah, Naga Siluman, Dan Maaf Belanda: Kolom Sejarahwan J.J. Rizal Tentang Makna Di Balik Penyerahan Kembali Keris Diponegoro Oleh Belanda," April 11, 2020. <https://majalah.tempo.co/read/selingan/160155/kolom-jj-rizal-jokowi-belanda-dan-keris-diponegoro>.
- Roser, Max. "The Spanish Flu (1918-20): The Global Impact of the Largest Influenza Pandemic in History." *Our World in Data*, March 4, 2020. <https://ourworldindata.org/spanish-flu-largest-influenza-pandemic-in-history>.
- Rumadi. "Islam Dan Otoritas Keagamaan." *Walisongo* 20, no. 1 (Mei 2012): 25–53.
- Saat, Norshahril. *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*. Edited by Ahmad Najib Burhani. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020.
- Saat, Norshahril, and Ahmad Najib Burhani, eds. *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020.
- Sampurno, Muchammad Bayu Tejo, Tri Cahyo Kusumandyoko, and Muh Ariffudin Islam. "Budaya Media Sosial, Edukasi Masyarakat, Dan Pandemi COVID-19." *SALAM: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Syar-i* 7, no. 5 (April 14, 2020). <https://doi.org/10.15408/sjsbs.v7i5.15210>.
- Saputro, Immanuela P. "Analisis Kesiapan Gereja Kristen Protestan Melakukan Ibadah Daring Selama Pandemi Covid19 Menggunakan Metode Inferensi Tsukamoto." *Jurnal Ilmiah Realtech* 16, no. 2 (November 6, 2020): 67–72. <https://doi.org/10.52159/realtech.v16i2.136>.
- Sayfa Auliya Achidsti. *Kiai Dan Pembangunan Institusi Sosial*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2015.

- Setyadi, Yusuf. "Social And Security Impact Of Covid-19 Outbreak In West Kalimantan Based On The Police Law Perspective." *Syariah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Pemikiran* 20, no. 1 (July 2, 2020): 14–27. <https://doi.org/10.18592/sjhp.v20i1.3771>.
- Simon, Ben. "Religion in Conservative Mideast Adapts to Coronavirus." *The Jakarta Post*, March 24, 2020. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/03/24/religion-in-conservative-mideast-adapts-to-coronavirus.html>.
- Suharyadi, Suharyadi, Evi Maria, Adriyanto Juliastomo Gundo, and Irwan Sembiring. "Digitalisasi Gereja Kristen Jawa Salatiga Timur: Solusi Pelayanan Jemaat Di Tengah Pandemi Covid-19." *SELAPARANG Jurnal Pengabdian Masyarakat Berkemajuan* 4, no. 2 (April 5, 2021): 243–49. <https://doi.org/10.31764/jpmb.v4i2.4046>.
- Tagliacozzo, Eric. "Pilgrim Ships and the Frontiers of Contagion: Quarantine Regimes from Southeast Asia to the Red Sea." In *Histories of Health in Southeast Asia Perspectives on the Long Twentieth Century*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014.
- Toresan, Wa Ode Zainab Zilullah. "Integrasi Sains Dan Agama: Meruntuhkan Arogansi Di Masa Pandemi Covid-19." *MAARIF* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 231–45.
- Turmudi, Endang. *Perselingkuban Kiai Dan Kekuasaan*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004.
- Ugak, Keloso S., Alexandra Binti, Hendra, and Wahyuno. "Persepsi Jemaat Terhadap Ibadah Minggu Live Streaming Gereja Kalimantan Evangelis (GKE) Eppata Banjarmasin." *Jurnal Teologi Pabelum* 1, no. 1 (August 31, 2020): 21–42.
- Wahid, Din. "Challenging Religious Authority: The Emergence of Salafi Ustadhs in Indonesia." *JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM* 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2012): 245–64. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2012.6.2.245-264>.
- Walker, Kirsty. "The Influenza Pandemic of 1918 in Southeast Asia." In *Histories of Health in Southeast Asia Perspectives on the Long Twentieth Century*, Harper Team and Sunil S. Amrith (ed). Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014.
- Widjaja, Fransiskus Irwan, Fredik Melkias Boiliu, Didimus SB Prasetya, Haposan Simanjuntak, and Vicky BGD Paat. "Menuju Evolusi Ibadah Kristen Di Masa Pandemi Covid-19." *Jurnal Teologi Berita Hidup* 3, no. 2 (2021). e-journal.sttberitahidup.ac.id/index.php/jbh.
- Yanti, Budi, Eko Wahyudi, Wahiduddin Wahiduddin, Revi Gama Hatta Novika, Yuliana Mahdiyah Da'at Arina, Natalia Sri Martani, and Nawan Nawan. "Community Knowledge, Attitudes, And Behavior Towards Social Distancing Policy As Prevention Transmission Of Covid-19 In Indonesia." *Jurnal Administrasi Kesehatan Indonesia* 8, no. 2 (2020): 4–14.