



REDUCTION OF RELIGION: ATTITUDE AND RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR OF INDONESIAN COLLEGE STUDENTS

M. Hanafiah¹, Nadiyah², Lutfi³

^{1,2}Universitas Islam Negeri Antasari, Banjarmasin, Indonesia

³University of Canberra, Australia

e-mail: m.hanafiah@uin-antasari.ac.id¹, nadiyahkhalid.seff@gmail.com²,
lutfi.lufi@canberra.edu.au³

Abstract

This research is motivated by the phenomenon of strengthening radicalism in the campus involving students and lecturers. The findings of several studies confirm an increasing trend of radicalism among students. The purpose of this research is to answer the main issue of the research which is to find out radicalism among public and religious college students. This research is field research, data and information obtained directly in the field, using quantitative methods. Data collection techniques through a closed questionnaire (*closed questionnaire*) using a Likert Scale. A number of universities in Java and Kalimantan were sampled in this study. This research found that radicalism among public and religious college students fluctuated with narrative responses at the level of *soft* radicalism. However, the narrative of radicalism is so strong in understanding, but tends to show a downward trend in attitudes and behavior. The idea of applying Islamic law is still the main choice for most respondents, but it is inversely related to the response to the application of the caliphate. Prohibition of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) organization is effective in reducing the attitude and behavior of radicalism among students.

Keywords: *reduction; religion; attitude; behavior; religious; College.*

Abstrak

Penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh fenomena menguatnya paham radikalisme di lingkungan kampus yang melibatkan mahasiswa dan dosen. Temuan beberapa penelitian mengonfirmasi adanya tren peningkatan radikalisme di kalangan mahasiswa. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menjawab permasalahan utama penelitian yaitu untuk mengetahui radikalisme di kalangan mahasiswa perguruan tinggi umum dan agama. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian lapangan (*field research*), data dan informasi diperoleh secara langsung di lapangan, dengan menggunakan metode kuantitatif. Teknik pengumpulan data melalui kuesioner tertutup (*angket tertutup*) dengan menggunakan Skala Likert. Sejumlah perguruan tinggi di Pulau Jawa dan Kalimantan menjadi sampel dalam penelitian ini. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa radikalisme di kalangan mahasiswa perguruan tinggi umum dan agama berfluktuasi dengan respon narasi pada tingkat radikalisme lunak. Namun, narasi radikalisme yang begitu kuat dalam pemahaman, namun cenderung menunjukkan tren penurunan dalam sikap dan perilaku. Gagasan penerapan syariat Islam masih menjadi pilihan utama bagi sebagian besar responden, namun berbanding terbalik dengan respon penerapan khilafah. Pelarangan organisasi Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) efektif dalam mereduksi sikap dan perilaku radikalisme di kalangan mahasiswa.

Kata kunci: reduksi; agama; sikap; perilaku; radikalisme; mahasiswa.

INTRODUCTION

Until now, radicalism has become an understanding that causes fear rooted in all people's minds¹. Radicals are known as organized radical groups, and the term radical Islamic group appears when the term is associated with Islam². Radical groups here are sometimes referred to as hard-liners who are very fanatical about a religious leader and believe that it is a necessity that must be performed or known as *al-tatharruf al-diiniy* in Arabic³. An initial finding from research on radical campus groups reported that the pattern of recruitment and regeneration of radical campus groups followed patterns that were performed with different religious approaches⁴.

The world today is more and more concerned with the rise of radicalism, populism and youth-oriented organizations that embrace the complexities of religion. As in several suicide bombings in different city centers in parts of Europe, including Indonesia. Young people are the majority of the perpetrators⁵. As evidenced by various attitudes of instability and self-vulnerability, at a young age is a time to search for self-identity. Such conditions are, of course, very easily influenced and used with online media networks as material for ideological penetration.

Media as a gateway to religious approaches is undeniably happening on all social media platforms, from positive to negative nuances⁶. A religious approach is then required to strengthen young people so that the negative development of the times does not erode them. Unfortunately, however, all this is not balanced with the comprehensive religious knowledge that causes Ulama fanaticism, which is characteristic of a sense of pride and a sense of righteousness in religion⁷.

This type of situation allows religious radicals to influence them by taking a "heavenly" ideology as their response to today's chaotic nature, using a mental and emotional approach. A variety of ideas, such as criticism of Pancasila (the five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia) ideology and government depravity, started incorporating radical ideology. This resentment will easily penetrate the souls of young people, even if it is a criminal act in the eyes of the law. Networks like this usually propagate in the mass media, and then prove their existence by terror and other acts of violence in the community⁸.

This is a challenge for young Indonesians to strengthen themselves in order to avoid being easily influenced and to become supporters of radical groups, extremists and terrorists who have recently been using religious motives in a jihadist language. That immunity pattern cannot be achieved without a comprehensive understanding of Islam followed by immunity within families, communities and media groups.

If left untreated, this understanding of radicalism will disrupt the order and harmony of

¹ Miriam Fernandez, Moizzah Asif, and Harith Alani, "Understanding the Roots of Radicalisation on Twitter," in *Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web Science* (ACM, 2018), 1–10.

² Anne Aly et al., *Introduction to the Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization* (Taylor & Francis, 2017); Samuel J. Leistedt, "On the Radicalization Process," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 61, no. 6 (2016): 1588–91.

³ Alexander R. Arifianto, "Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or Radicalism?," *Asian Security* 15, no. 3 (2019): 323–42.

⁴ Garth Davies et al., "Toward a Framework Understanding of Online Programs for Countering Violent Extremism," *Journal for Deradicalization*, no. 6 (2016): 51–86.

⁵ Lukis Alam, "ISLAMIZATION, PIETY, FUNDAMENTALISM: RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN CAMPUS," *Islam Realitas: Journal of Islamic & Social Studies* 4, no. 2 (2018): 104–20.

⁶ K. G. McLaughlin, "Disabling the Subject: From Radical Vulnerability to Vulnerable Radicals," *Annual Review of Critical Psychology* 13 (2017): 1–15.

⁷ Irfan Abubakar, "Effective Strategic Communication in Countering Radicalism in Indonesia," *Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*. Retrieved November 27 (2016): 2017.

⁸ Leonie Schmidt, "Cyberwarriors and Counterstars: Contesting Religious Radicalism and Violence on Indonesian Social Media," *Asiascape: Digital Asia* 5, no. 1–2 (2018): 32–67.

the nation-state's life in Indonesia, because terrorist acts have been shown to be inspired by such radical ideas⁹. Moreover, Indonesia is threatened with falling into the pool of bloody chaos now being experienced by brainwashing methods that respite "radical religion" in Syria and other Middle East countries¹⁰.

The "brainwash" method used by radical groups on campuses has negative aims when the research findings are valid. In such cases, a change of ideological points of view and the formation of opposing positions or possible threats to national security is the purpose of the "brainwashing" method¹¹. The four nationalities, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Unity in diversity, and the United Republic of Indonesia, are contravening ideology and practice. In this case.

Among Indonesia's largest young generation, higher education is one of the hubs among academic learning, knowledge, expertise, and human excellence. It is easy to understand whether those institutions, due to their demographic, social status and future intellectual and leadership potential, also become targets to spread radical ideologies¹². It is highly risky that the hegemony of organic intellectual group will become radical ideology. Youth, especially university students in Indonesia, have the future of the Republic of Indonesia.

This thesis departs from Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog's writings entitled: "Why are the Islamic Radicals so many engineers?" In his writings, he tried to see the relationship with an educational background between the attitude of radicalism. He compiled a list of 404 Muslims in his writings who committed violence in religion's name. Of these 404 people, 196 had received higher education and 78 had education engineering from these 196 members and 7 were from general science¹³.

This research will also explore further meanings of radicalism strengthened on campus circles, which, in several studies, have stated that attitudes and behaviors towards radicalism and violence were shaped by the organizational ideology in which students are strongly involved. This study seeks to portray the radicalism of public and religious higher education students. The results of the research attempt to demonstrate that the new format in religious formation demonstrates that religion is reduced and that Islam is narrated as part of the recommendations of this study, and also the development of a new format of religious instruction in Indonesian tertiary institutions.

METHOD

This research is based on field research using quantitative methods with survey technology where data and information are gathered in the field directly. Survey research is analysis using a questionnaire as a medium for an interview. Interviews using interview techniques in the form of

⁹ Abdallah Abdallah, "Exclusivism and Radicalism in Schools: State Policy and Educational Politics Revisited," *Studia Islamika* 23, no. 3 (2016): 625–32.

¹⁰ Benedetta Berti and Axel Bea Osete, "'Generation War': Syria's Children Caught between Internal Conflict and the Rise of the Islamic State," *Strategic Assessment* 18, no. 3 (2015): 45–56.

¹¹ Carmen Aguilera-Carnerero and Abdul Halik Azeez, "'Islamonausa, Not Islamophobia': The Many Faces of Cyber Hate Speech," *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research* 9, no. 1 (2016): 21–40.

¹² Jarred Prier, "Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (2017).

¹³ Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, "Why Are There so Many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?," *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 50, no. 2 (2009): 201–30.

a questionnaire to guide research instruments. All students of higher education in Indonesia are part of this report. Students of general higher education and religion in Indonesia completed the questionnaire¹⁴.

Universities are geographically scattered over the Java and Kalimantan Islands. For Java Island, Brawijaya Malang University has been elected to represent general higher education, and Kediri State Islamic Institute serves religious education. The Kalimantan tertiary institutions sampled were 1 (one) in East Kalimantan and 6 (six) in South Kalimantan, namely: Lambung Mangkurat University (ULM), Mulawarman University (UNMUL), Kalimantan Islamic University Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad Al Banjari (UNISKA), University Veteran Ahmad Yani (UVAYA) and Banjarmasin State Polytechnic (POLIBAN) representing public universities and Antasari Islamic State University (UIN) with a total number of respondents 96 (ninety-six) people.

Selecting many tertiary institutions was focused on growing religious awareness among students at the tertiary institution and the emergence in several of these faculties of religious communities. A closed questionnaire using a Likert Scale was the method used in that analysis. In instruments with many queries, the Likert scale is used. Interviews and knowledge used to refer to the methods of science research during this analysis and evaluation process. Interviews were conducted in document / library research to collect data and information obtained from records. In addition, interviews have been performed using questionnaires and standardized interviews (using interview guidelines) to analyze data and information obtained from respondents / informants.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Radicalism: An Inclusive Structured Pattern

Radicalism in the sense of language means understanding or flow that wants social or political change or renewal through violence or violence. However, in another sense, the essence of radicalism is the concept of the attitude of the soul to change. The general argument frequently put forward by some parties is that the radical groups 'propensity to commit force and justify any means by which to achieve the goal of terrorist bombing by radical groupings due to injustices existing in this country.

Looking at it in a religious sense, it can be viewed as a very fundamental religious definition of a higher standard of religious fanaticism. It is not shocking that those who adopt this view sometimes use violence to change their beliefs, but they must be compelled to do so. However, when juxtaposed with Islam, he never taught violence in various ways and always teaches unity, even to non-Muslims. Islam never justifies violence in spreading faith or interpreting religious texts.

Development of Radicalism Patterns in the Educational World

MAARIF Research Institute in 2011¹⁵ on Mapping the Problem of Radicalism in Public Middle Schools in 4 regions (Pandeglang, Cianjur, Yogyakarta, and Solo) which collected data from

¹⁴ Bubaker F. Shareia, "Qualitative and Quantitative Case Study Research Method on Social Science: Accounting Perspective," *Dimension* 2, no. 5 (2016): 23; Trenton A. Williams and Dean A. Shepherd, "Mixed Method Social Network Analysis: Combining Inductive Concept Development, Content Analysis, and Secondary Data for Quantitative Analysis," *Organizational Research Methods* 20, no. 2 (2017): 268–98.

¹⁵ Ahmad Fuad Fanani, "Fenomena Radikalisme Di Kalangan Kaum Muda," *MAARIF* 8, no. 1 (2013): 4–13.

50 schools trying to photograph the phenomenon of radicalism among students. According to this research, the school becomes an open space for the dissemination of any understanding. Because schools are too open, religious radicalism groups use this open space to actively campaign for their understanding by utilizing their networks at school. Religious groups ranging from extreme understanding, groups who like to blaspheme against the state and the 1945 Constitution to establish an Islamic state, to Islamic groups who want to fight for the formal enforcement of Islamic law.

Because of getting the wrong understanding of religion, as well as the efforts of radical groups to strengthen and transfer radical ideas at school, finally many students who have a monolithic understanding of Islam and like to blame others. Because of this closed understanding of religion, their sense of nationalism was eroded and exhausted. Ironically, many schools do not care about religious ideas that are spread through Rohis activities in schools. This may be because they believe too much in the independence of their students or it could be because the Rohis group enters the activities of school students when school hours are over. An interesting finding from the MAARIF Institute's research is that various radically motivated religious organizations fill open spaces in schools by carrying out their respective agendas. This group also brought the understanding of Islam that they understood to enter the school room to fill the empty space of state ideology.

Previously, a survey conducted by the Islamic Studies and Peace Institute (LaKIP) also showed the same results. The survey¹⁶, conducted in the period October 2010 to January 2011, was conducted in 59 private schools and 41 public schools in 10 regions in Greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi). This survey took a sample of 993 junior high and high school students. The survey results showed that the majority (50%) of students agreed to commit acts of violence or radical acts for the sake of religion. As many as 14.2% of students agreed with the terrorist acts carried out by Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and Noordin M Top. As many as 84.8% of students also agree with Islamic law enforcement. Meanwhile, as many as 25.8% of students consider Pancasila to be no longer relevant as a state ideology. Although some parties doubt the results, this survey can be an alarm or warning light about the future of the Indonesian people¹⁷.

Because of many factors, deviations can happen. When one understands a model differ from the general interpretation, social deviation may occur in relation to religious understanding. The model of textual understanding maintains people confined to text alone, and the romantic approach to understanding history can also make people lose their critical power. Two approach models for understanding religious teachings are likely to lead to a conflict of values in someone.

Data Presentation: Assumptions and Patterns of Religious Attitudes

The survey respondents were students from general and religious universities throughout Indonesia. The questionnaires were completed. Some of these universities spread geographically across the Java and Kalimantan Islands. Universitas Brawijaya Malang was appointed as the representative for public universities on Java Island and religious universities on the Kediri State

¹⁶ Noermala Sary, "Mencegah Penyebaran Paham Radikalisme Pada Sekolah," *Manthiq* 2, no. 2 (2017): 191–200.

¹⁷ Ahmad Sholikin, "POTRET SIKAP RADIKALISME MENUJU PADA PERILAKU TERORISME DI KABUPATEN LAMONGAN," *Journal of Governance* 3, no. 2 (2018): 184–202; Subhani et al., "Student Radicalism Ideology Prevention Strategy: A Study at an Islamic Boarding School in Jabal Nur, North Aceh, Indonesia," in *Proceedings of MICO MS 2017* (Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018), 401–7.

Islamic Institute (IAIN). The higher education institutions in Kalimantan that were sampled were 1 (one) in East Kalimantan, namely Mulawarman University (UNMUL), and 6 (six) in South Kalimantan, namely: Lambung Mangkurat University (ULM), Kalimantan Islamic University Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad Al Banjari (UNISKA), Ahmad Yani Veterans University (UVAYA) and Banjarmasin State Polytechnic (POLIBAN) representing public universities and Antasari State Islamic University (UIN). The total number of respondents was 96 (ninety six) people.

Characteristics of student respondents by gender were 43.8% male and 56.3% female. They are scattered in several faculties which are detailed in the table below.

ORIGIN OF HIGHER EDUCATION	FACULTY OF	DEPARTMENT / STUDY PROGRAM
General		
College University	Faculty of Economics and Business	Accounting Management
	Faculty of Law	Civil Law Business Law
	Faculty of Industrial	Engineering Environmental Engineering Civil Engineering Mechanical Engineering Electrical Engineering Information Systems Geology
	Faculty of Teacher Training and Education	Education History Literature Indonesia
	Faculty of Fisheries Fisheries	Product Technology
	Faculty of Forestry Forestry	Science
	Faculty of Mathematics and Natural	Sciences Computer Science
	Faculty of	Medicine Dentistry Psychology
Polytechnic		Accounting Financial Institutions Sharia Business Administration
College of Religion	Faculty of Economics and Business Islamic	Economics Islamic Economics Sharia Banking Sharia Banking
	Tarbiyah and Teaching	Tadris Physics Tadris Chemistry Teacher Education Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (PGMI) Islamic Education Guidance and Counseling (BKPI) Islamic Religious Education Arabic Language Education
	Faculty of Da'wah and Communication Studies	Guidance on Islamic Counseling

The results of the questionnaire show that the students' global approach gradually leads to a degree of moderation in their religious understanding. Some questions seemed militant with the responses of respondents, others with moderate problems. Some of them follow the same pendulum of narratives, namely militarism and restraint on issues which fall within the militant and moderate category, but there are also random ones, where militant issues are raised together.

In public and religious tertiary institutions, there are potential radical understanding tendencies, as it is undeniably possible that students who have historically been exposed to radical understanding may be traced to contact radicals if they are in high school or equivalent. This involves the potential for thinking, acting, acting, and for a radical (radical) ideology that is increasingly reactive during the student phase, starting at high school with radical ideas. This is consistent with Muhammad Syauqillah's statement that almost 100% of the non-faith educated people who were exposed to radical understanding. They can be exposed to radical understanding since high school (SMA) or in college.

The high school students' exposure to radicalism is caused by the lack of religious education that encourages them to read Islamic (themed) literature from the outside which mostly contains radical narratives. The lack of religious studies encourages them (to increase their religious knowledge) by reading religious books and taking additional studies (extra) on religious activities inside and outside school. Books that are read and religious activities that are followed may be harder teaching than those taught by religious teachers in the classroom, thus affecting students' understanding when interacting at school.

This is in line with several research results that show the facts on the ground that radicalism movements and networks have long infiltrated public schools, namely high schools / equivalent. High school students were targeted for planting radical ideology. *Daurah balaqah* and *mabit* in a very positive side and help the work of teachers of religion to instill faith and Islamic law to the learners. But on the other hand, the Islamic model taught tends to encourage students to be intolerant of other parties. Students who are still very ignorant about understanding religion and psychologically are looking for self-identity have become fertile ground targeted by supporters of radical ideology. The target is even to dominate intra-school student organizations (OSIS), at least in the spiritual part of Islam (Rohis). The thing to watch out for is when there are radical ideological spreaders who then take advantage of Islamic symbols, sentiments, and "clothes" to (*brain wash*) those who are beginners in studying religion for the purpose of actually damaging religion and causing conflict.

Radical narratives in respondents tend to fluctuate, in the sense that for certain issues the narration that is developed has a radical pattern, but the narrative is not radical (moderate) on other issues. The ascending trend has instead reappeared in the narrative of the application of Islamic law, but declined when the element of violence accompanied the application of Islamic law. They participated in the activities of the KSI (Islamic Study Group) in schools which incidentally became a catalyst for the development of radical understanding in schools. They, in addition to introducing different types of religious activities with unique and interesting names, such as *mabit* (a kind of camp activity with a strong Islamic nuance), *daurah* (intensive training on Islam) and *halaqah* (Islamic studies), also enter into activities that are already in schools, like the Ramadan boarding school.

Variatively regarding role models of clerics, based on the survey results it was found that scholars whose thoughts they followed were: Yusuf Mansur as many as 51 people (53.1%), Arifin Ilham as many as 49 people (51%), Habib Rizieq as many as 26 people (27.1 %), Bachtiar Nashir as many as 25 people (26%), Abu Bakar Baasyir as many as 8 people (8.3%), and Ust. Amman Abdurrahman as many as 1 person (1%). The most religious information obtained from informants came from television (74%), mosques (76%), campus (61.5%), majelis taklim (59.4%),

prayer rooms (34.4%), and from homes (30.2%). Questions related to sources of information obtained by respondents, in this study intentionally not raised social media in order to see whether in addition to social media there are potential communication channels that facilitate the spread of radical understanding of the figures chosen by respondents. Based on the results of respondents' answers, television is still a favorite source of information in getting religious information. The students still put the taklim assembly as a reference in getting religious understanding. The appeal of the taklim assembly not only rests on interest in the lecturer, but also the value of the reward obtained is greater than listening to lectures through other media. In addition, the school's orientation from the informant will be clearly illustrated by him visiting the taklim assembly.

Geographically, the distribution of respondents who chose majelis taklim was more respondents from universities in Kalimantan, especially South Kalimantan. The existence of majelis taklim in Kalimantan is a form of local wisdom of the community which is still maintained and the nature of the study is more directed to moral or moral development with the dominance of Sufism content. This also causes the radicalism narrative formed by the respondents to fluctuate, meaning that in some cases there appears to be a moderate narrative, but in some cases a militant narrative appears.

According to data from SIMPENAI (Islamic Information Management System), the number of taklim assemblies on Kalimantan Island is 3,733 with the following details: in South Kalimantan there are 1439, East Kalimantan is 920, Central Kalimantan is 223, West Kalimantan is 1027 units, and North Kalimantan totaling 124 units. Specifically in South Kalimantan, the detailed distribution of majelis taklim based on regencies / cities is as follows: Banjar Regency 495 units (34.4%), Hulu Sungai Selatan Regency 1 piece (2.64%), Hulu Sungai Utara Regency 389 units (27) , 03%), Tabalong District 193 units (13.41%), Tanah Bumbu District 154 units (10.7%), Balangan District 169 units (11.74%), and Banjarbaru City 38 units (2.64%) .

Respondents to the issue of varying application of Islamic law were given by respondents. As many as 33 people (34.4%) respondents strongly agree and 6 people (6.3%) disagree. The rest are in the range of agreeing and disagreeing. This means that the majority of respondents agreed to the application of Islamic law in Indonesia. But the issue of applying Islam is diametrically inversely proportional to the issue of the caliphate. At least the number of respondents who strongly agree with the application of Islamic law in Indonesia is not the same as the number of respondents who agree to the application of the khilafah in Indonesia. Quantitatively those who strongly agree with the application of the Khilafah are 20 people (20.8%). This means that as many as 13 people who chose strongly agreed related to the application of Islamic law changed direction when the issue of khilafah was asked. There are at least 4 (four) possible causes of non-correlative between the choice of the application of Islamic law and the enforcement of the khilafah.

1. *First*: related to the prohibition of the Indonesian Hizb ut-Tahrir group (HTI) by the government by revoking HTI's legal status based on Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number AHU-30.AH.01.08 of 2017 concerning Revocation of Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights number AHU-0028.60. 10.2014 concerning Ratification of the Establishment of a Legal Entity of the HTI Association. The government policy that revoked HTI's legal status was followed up by the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education by instructing the chancellor to supervise lecturers and students involved in HTI. This policy succeeded in changing the mainstream of radical student thought.

2. *Second:* The perception of the application of Islamic law is interpreted differently from the enforcement of the caliphate. The Khilafah is to change the state system in the sense of the desire to change the social order through political control of the state by changing the ideology of the unitary state into the caliphate. While the application of Islam is interpreted as accommodating Islamic values in the lives of Indonesian Muslim communities without changing the state system. Respondents whose choice is consistent between the application of Islamic law and the establishment of the caliphate can be categorized as formative Islam, while respondents who differ diametrically between the choice of implementing Islamic law and the enforcement of the caliphate are categorized as substantive Muslims.
3. *Third:* The prohibition of HTI on campus, causes some to hide their ideological involvement by answering disagreements with HTI,
4. *Fourth:* HTI's massive ideas among students do not get total support and even fade in line with the massive campus policy in relocating the idea of khilafah by HTI and intake of infiltration that conducted by lecturers exposed to radicalism also faded. As a result, Muslim activists who were respondents in this study felt increasingly limited support. This limitation is due to the fact that the campus does not provide a place, also because the idea of HTI by carrying out the Khilafah is not connected with the thought of applying the Khilafah with a substantial Islamic model that is different from formal Islam.

Regarding non-Muslim leadership, 53 respondents (55.2%) answered that the leader must be a Muslim, and as many as 6 respondents (6.3%) agreed that the leader did not have to be Muslim. Related to the issue of state administration in Islam, from the 4 issues surveyed, namely: the issue of the application of Islamic law, the issue of establishing the caliphate, the issue of leaders must be Muslim, and the issue of jihad, then the issue of leaders must be Muslim most responded by the total respondents who strongly agreed the leader 53 Muslims. There is consistency in the answers to these 3 issues, namely: the issue of applying Islamic law, the issue of establishing the caliphate, the issue of leaders must be Muslim. There are at least 2 respondents who consistently answered disagree to the three issues. The birth of moderate moderation can be traced from their contact (student activists) with moderate Islamic organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. This means that their activeness in these 2 organizations or at least their recognition of the 2 organizations gives a large portion of their gradations of radicalism. Their moderation of thought can also be traced by the lecturer being referred to, namely: Quraish Shihab, KH. Hasyim Muzadi, and KH. Said Aqil Siraj who is a representation of moderate clerics. Even though there were also varied choices for respondents who chose militant scholars with the three references above. However, the militant respondents randomly refer to Habib Riziq Shihab and Ust. Bahtiar Nashir.

The idea of rejection of non-Muslims as leaders does not necessarily come from those who hold the communal paradigm incorporated in ideological movements, because in the findings of this research, the rejection of non-Muslims as leaders is also carried out by activists whose orientation is toward modern organizations. The findings in this research indicate that respondents did not consistently answer the same to the issue of acceptance of non-Muslims as leaders. The three issues raised to map militancy and moderation narratives do not consistently occur. Radicalism and moderation up and down occur in the 3 issues above. Some were seen as militant when responding to the issue of the Khilafah, but still when faced with the issue of

accepting non-Muslims as leaders, it seemed moderate. But there are also those who simultaneously respond to these three issues, the response looks militant. The concept of militancy in question refers to the thoughts and views and intolerant actions that seek to encourage change by taking the distance of open societies around (*opensociety*). There is sincerity, determination, and commitment to certain beliefs, thoughts, attitudes and principles that are built up in a militant. This principle is rooted in suspicion and hatred towards those who are not of one view or understanding.

CONCLUSION

Based on the study and analysis of data in order to answer the problem formulation, this study found that radicalism among general tertiary and religious college students fluctuated with narrative responses at the level of *soft* radicalism. The narrative of radicalism is so strong in understanding, but the trend is decreasing in attitudes and behavior. The idea of applying Islamic law is still the main choice in most respondents, but it is inversely related to the response to the application of the Khilafah. Prohibition of HTI organization is effective in reducing the attitude and behavior of radicalism among students. This study produced findings for further research in the field of the character of Islamic values for Civil Servants (PNS) who work in the Ministry of Religion to be able to see the potential of the roots of the seeds of understanding that deviate in the Republic of Indonesia's constitutional system.

Research Implications

Based on the results of the study, there are at least three important components to the dissemination of hard ideas in the name of religion. Strengthening the understanding created by religious studies at and outside the campus will improve religious thinking. Campuses are prone to non-official learning studies that lead to religious intolerance and radicalism; online and telegram media, including teaching materials, accelerate thinking and study from outside the campus.

Recommendation

This research has a positive impact on the deradicalization of the use of religious terms for negative purposes. Further investigation is recommended that, in order to reduce an incorrect understanding of religious education on campuses, the de-radicalization system through campus leadership policies must be implemented as early as possible.

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to reviewers and editors who helped with this manuscript until its publication. also the Government of the Republic of Indonesia through LITAPDIMAS research assistance in 2019. Also said to the dean of the Islamic faculty of the Islamic State University of Antasari and researchers at each university who have assisted in the completion of this research

REFERENCE

- Abdallah, Abdallah. "Exclusivism and Radicalism in Schools: State Policy and Educational Politics Revisited." *Studia Islamika* 23, no. 3 (2016): 625–32.
- Abubakar, Irfan. "Effective Strategic Communication in Countering Radicalism in Indonesia." *Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*. Retrieved November 27 (2016): 2017.
- Aguilera-Carnerero, Carmen, and Abdul Halik Azeez. "'Islamonausa, Not Islamophobia': The Many Faces of Cyber Hate Speech." *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research* 9, no. 1 (2016): 21–40.
- Alam, Lukis. "ISLAMIZATION, PIETY, FUNDAMENTALISM: RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN CAMPUS." *Islam Realitas: Journal of Islamic & Social Studies* 4, no. 2 (2018): 104–20.
- Aly, Anne, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas M. Chen. *Introduction to the Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization*. Taylor & Francis, 2017.
- Arifianto, Alexander R. "Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or Radicalism?" *Asian Security* 15, no. 3 (2019): 323–42.
- Berti, Benedetta, and Axel Bea Osete. "Generation War': Syria's Children Caught between Internal Conflict and the Rise of the Islamic State." *Strategic Assessment* 18, no. 3 (2015): 45–56.
- Davies, Garth, Christine Neudecker, Marie Ouellet, Martin Bouchard, and Benjamin Ducol. "Toward a Framework Understanding of Online Programs for Countering Violent Extremism." *Journal for Deradicalization*, no. 6 (2016): 51–86.
- Fanani, Ahmad Fuad. "Fenomena Radikalisme Di Kalangan Kaum Muda." *MAARIF* 8, no. 1 (2013): 4–13.
- Fernandez, Miriam, Moizzah Asif, and Harith Alani. "Understanding the Roots of Radicalisation on Twitter." In *Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web Science*, 1–10. ACM, 2018.
- Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. "Why Are There so Many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?" *European Journal of Sociology/ Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 50, no. 2 (2009): 201–30.
- Leistedt, Samuel J. "On the Radicalization Process." *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 61, no. 6 (2016): 1588–91.
- McLaughlin, K. G. "Disabling the Subject: From Radical Vulnerability to Vulnerable Radicals." *Annual Review of Critical Psychology* 13 (2017): 1–15.
- Prier, Jarred. "Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (2017).
- Sary, Noermala. "Mencegah Penyebaran Paham Radikalisme Pada Sekolah." *Manthiq* 2, no. 2 (2017): 191–200.
- Schmidt, Leonie. "Cyberwarriors and Counterstars: Contesting Religious Radicalism and Violence on Indonesian Social Media." *Asiascape: Digital Asia* 5, no. 1–2 (2018): 32–67.
- Shareia, Bubaker F. "Qualitative and Quantitative Case Study Research Method on Social Science: Accounting Perspective." *Dimension* 2, no. 5 (2016): 23.
- Sholikin, Ahmad. "POTRET SIKAP RADIKALISME MENUJU PADA PERILAKU TERORISME DI KABUPATEN LAMONGAN." *Journal of Governance* 3, no. 2 (2018): 184–202.
- Subhani, Ahmad Yani, Awaludin Arifin, Ti Aisyah, Kamaruddin, and Teuku Alfiady. "Student Radicalism Ideology Prevention Strategy: A Study at an Islamic Boarding School in Jabal

Nur, North Aceh, Indonesia.” In *Proceedings of MICoMS 2017*, 401–7. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018.

Williams, Trenton A., and Dean A. Shepherd. “Mixed Method Social Network Analysis: Combining Inductive Concept Development, Content Analysis, and Secondary Data for Quantitative Analysis.” *Organizational Research Methods* 20, no. 2 (2017): 268–98.